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#### Our interpretation is negatives should not be burdened with rejoinder against affs that defend something other than the desirability of topical action – winning the United States federal government should not substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws should always be a sufficient condition to vote negative.

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Our interpretation is key to predictable limits—a bounded topic serves as a predictable stasis point for debate that guarantees thematic coherence there are an infinite amount of affs under their interp, making the neg prepare for them is impossible and favors the aff because they get leverage unpredictable offense—absent defined limits, debate’s competitive incentives create a race to the margins that distorts topic research and kills clash. The impact is fairness—debate is a game one winner one loser, speech times, tabula rasa judging, concessions etc… all prove it’s an intrinsic good. Skirting negative research and preparations gives the aff an unfair advantage which should be rejected

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#### Using University debate spaces as a forum for criticism merely reifies and legitimates the University as a colonialist institution

Mayorga et al 19 Edwin Mayorga is Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Studies and the Program in Latín American and Latino Studies at Swarthmore College Lekey Leidecker is a Tibetan living in diaspora. Raised in Kentucky, she now lives on Piscataway lands. She holds a degree in Educational Studies and Sociology/Anthropology, but hopes you will look past that, Daniel Orr de Gutiérrez is a K-12 educator in Northern California. He holds a B.A. in Native Education from Swarthmore College and an M.A. in Teaching from the University of San Francisco. , Burn it Down: The Incommensurability of the University and Decolonization, Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis 2019, Vol. 8, No. 1, 87-106, <file:///C:/Users/sharris/Downloads/jctp-8029-mayorga.pdf>

Because the university is a fundamentally colonial institution, decolonization would require more than these self-serving half measures and instead, transforming its essential nature. As with all institutions, such transformation targets the university’s material dependency upon colonial exploitation, as well as its integration within and service to the settler state. For the university in particular however, we must attend to the colonialist ideology animating its knowledge functions. But without this, what remains of the university? Its research methods and methodologies, as well as knowledge packaging, sale, and institutionalization would have to be redirected from their current exploitative and repressive formulas (Smith, 2012; Simpson, 2014). Moreover, if we divest the university of its assumed authority over knowledge, what purpose does it serve? And upon whose authority does it act? In short, decolonization requires the university to become a totally new entity, vested with a new mission, organization, practices, and responsibilities. However, we realize that such comprehensive reform is not practically viable. The university is skilled in inhibiting structural reform. It does so not by simply dismissing or ignoring criticism, but by becoming ‘vigilant in its negligence’ (Moten & Harney, 2004, p. 106), incorporating critique nominally and adopting the appearance of sympathy, thereby circumventing a decolonial confrontation. In its vigilance, the university performs what Tuck and Yang (2012) term settler moves to innocence (p. 9), stratagems which, in the pretense of critical self-reflection, divert decolonial transformation into salvaging settler futurity and conscience. Swarthmore, for example, regularly employs "collections," convening the campus body, especially in response to an incident, inviting all attendees to speak. These gatherings demonstrate to a larger audience that the school is sensitive to campus concerns, that they are willing to give students and community members the space to express themselves, but without creating any responsibility to act upon those sentiments. In fact, the equal privilege afforded to all speakers, regardless of relations of power and personal benefit, makes the supposedly democratic space of the collection a venue for university representatives to discredit student and faculty concerns. Even when a school does sincerely critique its own coloniality, this “dialogue” is still undertaken for the purposes of absolvement and self-preservation rather than the restoration of indigenous sovereignty (Byrd, 2011). And as this nominal call for reform has become professional academic practice, the university reaffirms the necessity of its own existence through those who would question it (Moten & Harney, 2004). Thus the critical academic is made complicit in the institution’s negligence, locked into the university’s attempts to become amenable to those it oppresses. To be critical of the university traps one within settler futurity. And so, we, from our different positions, reject the desire for inclusion, for a more critically engaged university. Rather than confront an institution that will not, indeed cannot, recognize indigenous sovereignty, we seek self-recognition and indigenous modes of life independent of this settler apparatus (Coulthard, 2014). We acknowledge that the only possible relationship to the university is a criminal one (Moten & Harney, 2004), that those of us who survive the institution have a responsibility to betray it and appropriate its resources for our peoples (Fanon, 2005).

#### The inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to endless imperial warfare and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

**Vote negative to theorize form AND content specifically in the context of refusal --- a focus on debate and the ballot reproduces a focus on individual inducements to further justify inclusion within debate, making solvency predicated off being complicit in a colonized space**

**Grande 2018**

(Sandy Grande, Professor at Connecticut College, “Refusing the University”, 2018, <https://www.academia.edu/37026360/Refusing_the_University>)

In the broader field of critical theory, the work of Marcuse (1964) is central to theorizations of refusal. His central argument is that in modern capitalist societies— where worth is equated with the “reproduction of value” and “extraction of profit”— human beings only exist as “an instrumental means” of capital and, within this context, “simply to exist, to be, is an act of refusal” (Garland, 2013, p. 376). As such, refusal should not be confused with “passive withdrawal or retreat” but rather understood as an active instantiation of “a radically different mode- of- being and mode- of- doing” (p. 375). Frank Wilderson (2003) troubles the capitalist foundation of refusal from the standpoint of Black subjectivity. Specifically, in distinction to what he refers to as the “coherent” subjects of anti- capitalist struggle (e.g., the worker, the immigrant, the woman), Wilderson posits the “incoherence” of Black subjects (i.e., the unwaged slave, the prison slave) as destabilizing, as “the unthought” of historical materialism (pp. 21– 22). He writes: Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous…not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a negative dialectic: a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm a “program of complete disorder.” (Wilderson, 2003, p. 26) Within this context, Black refusal is theorized as “an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation)” (Wilderson, 2003, p. 26). Taking into account the power relations of both capitalism and white supremacy, Indigenous scholars posit refusal as a positive stance that is: less oriented around attaining an affirmative form of recognition… and more about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and tradition in ways that seek to prefigure… a radical alternative to the structural and psycho- affective facets of colonial domination. (Coulthard, 2007, p. 456) In this way, Indigenous refusal both negatively rejects the (false) promise of inclusion and other inducements of the settler state and positively asserts Indigenous sovereignty and peoplehood. In Mohawk Interruptus (2014), Audra Simpson theorizes refusal as distinct from resistance in that it does not take authority as a given. More specifically, at the heart of the text, she theorizes refusal at the “level of method and representation,” exposing the colonialist underpinnings of the “demand to know” as a settler logic. In response, she develops the notion of ethnographic refusal as a stance or space for Indigenous subjects to limit access to what is knowable and to being known, articulating how refusal works “in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that ‘this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights’ ” (Simpson, 2007, p. 73). Mignolo (2011) and Quijano (1991) similarly take up refusal in relation to knowledge formation, asserting Indigenous knowledge itself as a form of refusal; a space of epistemic disobedience that is “delinked” from Western, liberal, capitalist understandings of knowledge as production. Gómez- Barris (2012) theorizes the Mapuche hunger strikes as “an extreme bodily performance and political instantiation” of refusal, an act wherein their starving bodies upon the land literally enact what it means to live in a state of permanent war (p. 120). Understood as expressions of sovereignty, such acts of refusal threaten the settler state, carrying dire if not deadly consequences for Indigenous subjects. As noted by Ferguson (2015), “capitalist settler states prefer resistance” because it can be “negotiated or recognized,” but refusal “throws into doubt” the entire system and is therefore more dangerous. While within the university the consequences of academic refusal are much less dire, they still carry a risk. To refuse inclusion offends institutional authorities offering “the gift” of belonging, creating conditions of precarity for the refuser. For example, refusal to participate in the politics of respectability that characterizes institutional governance can result in social isolation, administrative retribution, and struggles with self- worth. Similarly, the refusal to comply with the normative structures of tenure and promotion (e.g., emphasizing quantity over quality; publishing in “mainstream” journals) can and does lead to increased marginalization, exploitation, and job loss.16 And, in a system where Indigenous scholars comprise less than 1% of the professorate, such consequences not only bear hardships for individuals but also whole communities. That said, academic “rewards” and inducements accessed through recognition- based politics can have even deeper consequences. As Jodi Byrd (2011) reminds us, the colonization of Indigenous lands, bodies, and minds will not be ended by “further inclusion or more participation” (Byrd, 2011, p. xxvi). The inspirational work of Black radical and Indigenous scholars compels thinking beyond the limits of academic recognition and about the generative spaces of refusal that not only reject settler logics but also foster possibilities of co- resistance. The prospect of coalition re- raises one of the initial animating questions of this chapter: What kinds of solidarities can be developed among peoples with a shared commitment to working beyond the imperatives of capital and the settler state? Clearly, despite the ubiquitous and often overly facile calls for solidarity, building effective coalitions is deeply challenging, even among insurgent scholars. Within this particular context, tensions between Indigenous sovereignty and decolonial projects and anti- racist, social justice projects, raise a series of suspicions: whether calls for Indigenous sovereignty somehow elide the a priori condition of blackness (the “unsovereign” subject),17 whether anti- racist struggles sufficiently account for Indigenous sovereignty as a land- based struggle elucidated outside regimes of property, and whether theorizations of settler colonialism sufficiently account for the forces and structures of white supremacy, racial slavery, and antiblackness. Rather than posit such tensions as terminally incommensurable, however, I want to suggest a parallel politics of dialectical co- resistance. When Black peoples can still be killed but not murdered; when Indians are still made to disappear; when (Indigenous) land and Black bodies are still destroyed and accumulated for settler profit; it is incumbent upon all those who claim a commitment to refusing the white supremacist, capitalist, settler state, to do the hard work of building “interconnected movements for decolonization” (Coulthard, 2014). The struggle is real. It is both material and psychological, both method and politics, and thus must necessarily straddle the both/ and (as opposed to either/or) coordinates of revolutionary change. In terms of process, this means working simultaneously beyond resistance and through the enactment of refusal— as fugitive, abolitionist, and Indigenous, sovereign subjects. Within the context of the university, this means replacing calls for more inclusive and diverse, safe spaces within the university with the development of a network of sovereign, safe houses outside the university. Kelley reminds us of the long history of this struggle, recalling the Institute of the Black World at Atlanta University (1969), the Mississippi Freedom Schools, and the work of Black feminists Patricia Robinson, Donna Middleton, and Patricia Haden as inspirational models. As a contemporary model, he references Harney and Moten’s vision of the undercommons as a space of possibility: a fugitive space wherein the pursuit of knowledge is not perceived as a path toward upward mobility and material wealth but rather as a means toward eradicating oppression in all of its forms (Undercommoning Collective). The ultimate goal, according to Kelley (2016), is to create in the present a future that overthrows the logic of neoliberalism. Scholars within Native studies similarly build upon a long tradition of refusing the university, theorizing from and about sovereignty through land- based models of education. Whereas a fugitive flees and seeks to escape, the Indigenous stands ground or, as Deborah Bird points out, “to get in the way of settler colonization, all the native has to do is stay at home” (as cited in Wolfe, 2006, p. 388). The ultimate goal of Indigenous refusal is Indigenous resurgence; a struggle that includes but is not limited to the return of Indigenous land. Again, while the aims may be different (and in some sense competing), efforts toward the development of parallel projects of co- resistance are possible through vigilant and sustained engagement. The “common ground” here is not necessarily literal but rather conceptual, a corpus of shared ethics and analytics: anti- capitalist, feminist, anti- colonial. Rather than allies, we are accomplices— plotting the death but not murder of the settler university. Toward this end, I offer some additional strategies for refusing the university: First and foremost, we need to commit to collectivity— to staging a refusal of the individualist promise project of the settler state and its attendant institutions. This requires that we engage in a radical and ongoing reflexivity about who we are and how we situate ourselves in the world. This includes but is not limited to a refusal of the cycle of individualized inducements— particularly, the awards, appointments, and grants that require complicity or allegiance to institutions that continue to oppress and dispossess. It is also a call to refuse the perceived imperative to self- promote, to brand one’s work and body. This includes all the personal webpages, incessant Facebook updates, and Twitter feeds featuring our latest accomplishments, publications, grants, rewards, etc. etc. Just. Make. It. Stop. The journey is not about self— which means it is not about promotion and tenure— it is about the disruption and dismantling of those structures and processes that create hierarchies of individual worth and labor. Second, we must commit to reciprocity— the kind that is primarily about being answerable to those communities we claim as our own and those we claim to serve. It is about being answerable to each other and our work. One of the many things lost to the pressures of the publish- or- perish, quantity-over-quality neoliberal regime is the loss of good critique. We have come to confuse support with sycophantic praise and critical evaluation with personal injury. Through the ethic of reciprocity, we need to remind ourselves that accountability to the collective requires a commitment to engage, extend, trouble, speak back to, and intensify our words and deeds. Third, we need to commit to mutuality, which implies reciprocity but is ultimately more encompassing. It is about the development of social relations not contingent upon the imperatives of capital— that refuses exploitation at the same time as it radically asserts connection, particularly to land. Inherent to a land- based ethic is a commitment to slowness and to the arc of inter- generational resurgence and transformation. One of the many ways that the academy recapitulates colonial logics is through the overvaluing of fast, new, young, and individualist voices and the undervaluing of slow, elder, and collective ones. And in such a system, relations and paradigms of connection, mutuality, and collectivity are inevitably undermined. For Indigenous peoples, such begin and end with land, centering questions of what it means to be a good relative. Toward this end, I have been thinking a lot lately about the formation of a new scholarly collective, one that writes and researches under a nom de guerre— like the Black feminist scholars and activists who wrote under and through the Combahee River Collective or the more recent collective of scholars and activists publishing as “the uncertain commons.”18 If furthering the aims of insurgence and resurgence (and not individual recognition) is what we hold paramount, then perhaps one of the most radical refusals we can authorize is to work together as one; to enact a kind of Zapatismo scholarship and a balaclava politics where the work of the collectivity is intentionally structured to obscure and transcend the single voice, body, and life. Together we could write in refusal of liberal, essentialist forms of identity politics, of individualist inducements, of capitalist imperatives, and other productivist logics of accumulation. This is what love as refusal looks like. It is the un- demand, the un- desire to be either of or in the university. It is the radical assertion to be on: land. Decolonial love is land.

#### Reject claims of solvency from their critique—to disrupt and rupture discourses of progress

Ladoen 21 Shannon Lodoen, PhD student in English and Rhetoric at the University of Waterloo, JoMR 4.2 Progress and Power in the First, Second, and Third Universities A Case Study of the University of Waterloo, <http://journalofmultimodalrhetorics.com/files/documents/248e1a2f-2932-44a9-91af-9a240f1cd37f.pdf>

The Third University Self-Actualizes (and then Self-Destructs) As I warned in my introduction, it is often hard to pinpoint spaces of the third university; as paperson (2017) notes in his conclusion, it is constantly assembling, constantly in a state of coming together, and yet also constantly “expiring” or losing its foothold (p. 52). In this sense, it does not subscribe to the same notions of linear progress that undergird the first and second universities. It is used to backsliding, having to change tack and move laterally; it is adaptable and resilient, and will not be stopped even when particular avenues are shut down or altered. paperson also notes that the third university “assembles decolonizing machines out of scrap parts from colonial technology. It makes itself out of assemblages of the first and second world universities” (p. 53). Essentially, it must use elements of the first and second universities in new ways, taking advantage of various loopholes or situations to push its decolonizing agenda; it does not aim for progress, as such, but for change, disruption, and rupture. It recognizes that “change” is not always necessarily for the better, but that change in some form must occur in order to decolonize the university. It also recognizes that changes are not permanent (as linear narratives of progress would suggest) but can fall apart or disperse as their need expires or new avenues arise.36 Thus, it also implicitly recognizes the importance of individual and collective labouring towards a common goal of decolonization, although this labour is often difficult and unacknowledged (and even challenged) by the institution where it takes place.

## Case

### 1NC---Double-Turn

#### 4---University-centered participatory structures --- Their advocacy entrenches the legitimacy of the critical academic star system. They emphasize academic qualifications as necessary for credibility. For example, Beller is embraced as a star in critical humanities. Pluto Press calls him

https://www.plutobooks.com/author/jonathan-beller/

Jonathan Beller is a revered film theorist, culture critic and mediologist. He is Professor of Humanities and Media Studies at the Pratt Institute and Director of the Graduate Program in Media Studies.

#### Their advocacy through the lens of celebrity critical Humanities academics like Beller is the commodification of academic capitalism

Sanbonmatsu 6 John Sanbonmatsu is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at the Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Worcester, POSTMODERNISM AND THE CORRUPTION OF THE ACADEMIC INTELLIGENTSIA, SOCIALIST REGISTER 2006, file:///C:/Users/sharris/Downloads/titusland,+SR\_2006\_sanbonmatsu.pdf

Significantly, of the twelve distinguished academics on the Board of the Humanities Research Institute at Irvine, six publish work in the area of poststructuralist cultural studies or postcolonialism.18 And of the dozens of workshops, seminars, colloquia, and conferences sponsored by the Institute, most have been on recognizably poststructuralist themes, or have featured scholars with a poststructuralist flair. As a multi-campus research program reporting directly to the Office of the UC President, the Humanities Research Institute at Irvine thus plays an important role in training a new cadre of postmodernist academics. In the last 17 years, the Institute has sponsored some 45 project teams, involved over 600 national and international fellows and participants, and hosted in residence over ‘500 scholars and other specialists representing over 60 disciplines in the humanities, arts, social sciences, technological fields, and sciences’.19 The Humanities Research Institute at Irvine is a good example of the convergence of postmodernism with two signal processes in the production and circulation of academic knowledge in the humanities today. The first is the increased level of contacts between humanities scholars and commercial industry. Of the sixteen members on the Institute’s Board of Governors, eight are professors of Literature or Film (including the current president of a top liberal arts college), two are professors of sociology and ethnic studies, one is Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, one is CEO of a Holocaust foundation, one is director of the J. Paul Getty Trust, one is chairman of the Executive Committee of the Walt Disney Company, and one is director of an academic think-tank on technology issues whose corporate sponsors include IBM, Ericsson, Microsoft, Intel, Siemens, Applied Materials, and Texas Instruments. The fact that leading scholars now rub shoulders with Walt Disney World and the Getty Trust, while not ominous in itself, is indicative of a subtle but important shift in the institutional fortunes of critical thought. Critical knowledges, which in the 18th and 19th centuries were weapons deployed by organic revolutionaries against the state, are rapidly being transformed into value-added instruments of the state and capital. The integration of corporations, humanist intellectuals, private foundations, and public education is now almost seamless. Postmodernism, with its chameleon-like ability to blend with its surroundings, has benefited from the new, corporate-enhanced environment. In what may be a sign of things to come, poststructuralist feminist theorist Lucy Suchman spent the mid-1990s working on the payroll of the Xerox research park in Palo Alto, applying postmodernist science studies discourse to developing new products for the Xerox Corporation.20 The Humanities Research Institute is in fact only one of a number of national and international humanities think-tanks that serve as nexus points for the reproduction and dissemination of postmodernist culture – institutions which have played a pivotal role in shoring up the market value of the humanities, chiefly by legitimating postmodernism within the academic field.21 One key feature of this legitimation process, and the second material factor in the circulation of theoretical discourse today, is the rise of the academic star system. Rationalization and the competition for resources has combined with popular media culture to thrust a handful of academic scholars to the uppermost echelons of an increasingly inegalitarian and cutthroat humanities system. The rise of the academic star system in the humanities has not only greatly exacerbated inequalities within the university system and the humanities; it has also inflated the importance of poststructuralist approaches by setting up postmodernist theorists as exemplars for younger scholars to emulate. Typically, the curricula of the humanities institutes features the same ‘A-list’ of academic celebrities. At the School of Criticism and Theory, for example, a summer institute sponsored by the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University, the majority of the School’s courses in 2005 were presided over by poststructuralist celebrities like Homi Bhabha, Joan Scott, Elizabeth Grosz, and Toril Moi. The School of Criticism and Theory at Cornell also regularly takes out paid advertisements in academic journals, promising graduate students and young scholars the opportunity to ‘study with leading figures in critical theory’ and to ‘explore recent developments in literary and humanistic studies’. As the ads unabashedly make clear: ‘The program sets up levels of expectations of what it takes to be a top-flight academic and scholar, not only in the United States, but internationally’.22 Clearly, no graduate student or young professor in the humanities today can afford to be uninterested in learning what today’s expectations of being ‘a top-flight academic and scholar’ are. The intellectual is now forced, like any other consumer, to participate in what Zygmunt Bauman calls ‘the endless chase for the appearances of use-value in which … commodities are wrapped’.23 And of the available scholarly commodities in the humanities today, postmodernism still fetches the highest price. There still remain humanities and social science institutes that have managed to avoid celebrity worship and poststructuralist canards alike. To give but one example, the Women’s Studies Department at Duke University (perhaps the best programme of its kind in the US) continues to sponsor institutes and conferences that are staunchly materialist, politically engaged, and historically grounded.24 But most of the leading centres for the distribution of ‘critical’ theory in the United States, Canada, and Europe – in cities like Atlanta, Birmingham, San Francisco, New York, Dublin, and Cardiff – still place the poststructuralist star at the centre of their philosophical cosmos. I have suggested that postmodernism has played a formative ideological role in the education of the contemporary intelligentsia, particularly its critical or radical wing. But one of the most striking aspects of postmodernism is that it functions less as a set of ideas or intellectual movement than as an ethos or ‘habitus’, a ‘structuring structure’ of practice that delimits the experiences of a particular culture.25 Postmodernism is at once a milieu, an epistemological orthodoxy, and a shared common sense about the world. It is defined not by principles so much as practices: in Foucault’s terms, regimes of ‘truth’ and ways of knowing the world, habits of bodily comportment and affect. This is why the most empirically satisfying accounts of life and thought in the academic humanities are to be found not in scholarly journals but in the satirical campus novels of writers like David Lodge, John L’Heureux, or James Hynes. Only vivid literary scenes, it seems, are able to convey fully the curious behaviour of the postmodern university intelligentsia. One of the consequences of the rise of the academic star system (of which postmodernism has been the prime beneficiary and exemplar) is the reduction of the theorist to the status of a scarce commodity. The star system represents the penetration of the university system by mass popular culture and commodity fetishism. ‘The individual who in the service of the spectacle is placed in stardom’s spotlight’, Guy Debord wrote, ‘is in fact the opposite of an individual, and as clearly the enemy of the individual in himself as of the individual in others.... [He] renounces all autonomy in order to identify himself with the general law of obedience to the course of things’.26 Indeed, the academic star is not so much a person as the fetish of a person: a charismatic body anointed by the market as a sign of academic capital.27 Such a star or superstar not only commands attention, he or she distorts entire fields of knowledge, like a black hole warping academic time-space. Less prominent scholars in the system are interpellated as voyeurs or remote fans of the spectacle of theory. The leading stars’ names themselves, cited repeatedly by other scholars, often serve as little more than ‘markers of truth’, ways of ‘authorizing’ scholarly procedure.28 Sycophancy, as well as intellectual standardization, cannot help but result. The star’s very proximity to power (academic capital) makes her or him coveted by graduate students, which in turn leads to corruption of the ethical relation between teacher and taught. Bourdieu observed of the fate of knowledge within highly competitive and hierarchical fields: The boldness or even rashness statutorily granted to some provides the best of justifications and the safest of alibis for the institutional prudence which is incumbent on the greater number. The cult of ‘brilliance’, through the facilities which it procures, the false boldness which it encourages, the humble and obscure labours which it discourages, is less opposed than it might seem to the prudence of academica mediocritas, to its epistemology of suspicion and resentment, to its hatred of intellectual liberty and risk.…29

#### Reject this attachment to university systems

Rodriguez 20 Dylan Rodríguez is President-Elect of the American Studies Association, WAR ON ETHNIC STUDIES: ETHNIC STUDIES RISING 07 JAN 2020, https://ethnicrise.github.io/roundtable/war-ethnic-studies/

It is worth recalling, over and again, that the modern university is a foundationally colonial, plantation chattel enterprise. A vibrant, growing movement for university reparations is magnifying the long historical centrality of anti-Black violence and racial slavery to the economic, academic, and cultural infrastructures of Georgetown, Princeton, Yale, Brown, and of course Harvard, among other places (see the Scholars for Social Justice platform on reparations in higher education). The global solidarity with the ongoing Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawai’ian) struggle to protect the sacred site of Mauna Kea from the invasive Thirty Meter Telescope (in which my employer has a major stake) further illustrates how the militarized procedures of conquest remain central to the settler university enterprise (see the global petition that has garnered almost 300,000 signatories). Make no mistake: the thriving university-focused reparations movement and struggle at Mauna Kea indicate the continuity and persistence of the modern university’s anti-Black, carceral-chattel, colonial settler-conquest logic as the economic, philosophical, scientific, and bureaucratic conditions of possibility for the making of the academy as such.

### 1NC---AT Bifo

#### Bifo is wrong about pretty much everything

Lack 19, Professor of Humanities @ Alamo College (Tony, Review of “The Second Coming,” <https://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviews/17192_the-second-coming-by-franco-bifo-berardi-reviewed-by-tony-lack/>)

Turning to a few criticisms, Berardi’s text is a loosely-woven collection of insights, many of which have appeared in previous publications. As such, it suffers from a coherent method and structure. Although his rhizomatic approach is suggestive and useful, he often falls back on conventional and unconvincing methods of analysis. He is especially fond of positing inverse relationships similar to those employed by Marx in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, ‘The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces . . .the worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things.’

Berardi employs the same logic throughout the text, like an hourglass, one part of life fills up in proportion to the other part emptying out. ‘Technological potency has steadily expanded while social consciousness has decreased proportionately’ (12).

Berardi also tends to use anecdotes instead of evidence when it suits his purpose. For example, he claims that two factors responsible for our inability to interpret our way out of the labyrinthine system are sensory overload and a decline in the quality of education. ‘The expansion of the infosphere has forced the acceleration of the mental reaction to info-nervous stimulation. But the critical mind is unable to function in conditions of info-nervous saturation, while the rate of education and the quality of education have fallen and deteriorated’ (19).

Both of these assertions are problematic. Regarding sensory overload, which Berardi refers to as the inability of the ‘psychosphere’ to keep up with the ‘infosphere,’ humans have always been challenged by information rich environments. We adapt quite rapidly to large quantities of stimuli that remain constant in our environment and we learn quickly how to focus our attention on the essential aspects of a complex situation. However, as the demand for screening out information increases we do probably become less empathetic and sensitive, which is one of Berardi’s important points.

Rather than brute information overload, it seems more likely that part of the problem is total absorption. We are like fish who don’t recognize the water, and the water is the ubiquitous complexity of prepackaged social relations expanding in open-ended structures, paths, and networks. The system works so well because the overall feel is not constriction and limitation, but expansive freedom and endless novelty.

The other problem is that it is not clear that we are becoming dumber. This is a form of Golden-Age thinking. Berardi claims that, ‘Idiocy is spreading worldwide as a revolt against the mathematical rationality of financial plundering: a blackout of reason, as revenge does not listen to reason’ (5). Yet the data suggests otherwise. The global literacy rate has increased by 4% every 5 years for the past 65 years, increasing from 42% worldwide in 1960 to 86% in 2015.

On the other hand, if Berardi’s concern about the spread of ‘idiocy’ refers to racism, sexism, xenophobia, and other forms of retrograde thinking, it is unlikely that this is a reaction to the unassailable machinations of the international financial system, as he claims. It seems more likely that our awareness of social injustices, as well as our capacity for empathy has increased, while the phenomena themselves have not become more widespread or barbaric.

Finally, Berardi’s fleeting comments about Taoism and Wu Wei, effortless action, are intriguing, given his description of a system that has no edges and no exterior. However, it is hard to tell what Berardi means because he often falls back on gnostic proclamations such as this when a clearer exposition is in order: ‘The secret is a content hidden from public view. You need the key that enables you to open the safe and you will know the hidden truth’ (100).

The Second Coming obviously refers to Yeats’ poem of the same title. Berardi’s apocalyptic tone and his refusal to offer so much as a glimpse of a better future might make us wonder what rough beast slouches toward us to be born, but that’s about it.

### 1NC---AT Logistics

#### Activism against logistics is possible, good, and can use the state, but it requires engaging and understanding the details of the system to form strategies of diversion at the individual and macro level

Quet 18

(Mathieu, CEPED at Paris Descartes University – IRD and CSSP at Jawaharlal Nehru University, “Pharmaceutical Capitalism and its Logistics: Access to Hepatitis C Treatment,” Theory, Culture & Society, Volume 35, Issue 2, March 2018, Snider)

Greg Jefferys’ story illustrates the modalities of individual engagement with logistical capitalism. One might note that as soon as he went back to Australia he started receiving emails from people from around the world so that his individual act acquired a collective importance. It invites us to look at engagement with circulation not only as an individual gesture but as a broader collective practice of critique and contestation of certain forms of organization. This practice of critique can be analyzed at different levels. Here I will discuss two: the level of self-organized patients’ groups and the level of the state. The first level of opposition and conflict that can be presented here is the level of civil society, through the experience of ‘buyers’ clubs’. The principle of a buyers’ club is to organize parallel imports between countries, understanding different levels of pricing or accessibility to medicines. This activity, being mostly based upon health access activism, generates little or no profit for those involved, yet every treatment channeled this way constitutes a loss for the patent owner. Of course the pharmaceutical companies are aware of the financial risk raised by tiered pricing and geographical restrictions. Therefore, they also tolerate this as part of their strategy – and yet the line between ‘some leakage’ and ‘large leaks’ is not easily drawn. The executive vice president for corporate and medical affairs of Gilead declared: ‘Some leakage is a given, our goal isn’t to stop it 100 percent; if we wanted that, we’d do it the draconian way and not be in the country at all. But we do want to stop large leaks.’12 Interestingly, this practice is not new: it had been developed in the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly with anti-HIV treatment, for reasons of cost or availability (Nguyen, 2010; Egrot, 2014; Taverne and Egrot, 2014). It has subsequently been practiced in different ways: from Brazil or India to sub-Saharan Africa and from Europe to sub-Saharan Africa, most notably. It has been common practice in the networks of AIDS activism, as this remark from an Indian AIDS activist illustrates: ‘Since hepatitis C came, this thing [buyers’ clubs] comes up. But I have been doing this for the last 10 to 15 years!’ (AIDS activist 1, interview). However, in the case of anti-hepatitis C medicines, several aspects indicate the novelty or renewal of this practice. First, the use of the internet has offered the possibility to create networks of buyers and distributors very easily. As another activist involved in a buyers’ club in India explained to me: ‘this is the beauty of internet. We are people from different continents, taking part in the same project. We have met only once but we managed to set up a very efficient organization’ (AIDS activist 2, interview). It has offered the possibility of connecting many people to buyers’ clubs without their having to actually move to another country. Greg Jefferys is, for instance, offering through his blog to connect patients to his contacts in India in order to get cheaper medicines. He also emphasizes the fact that many people are contacting him from all over the world. The second aspect of this renewal is the pressure applied by anti-hepatitis C groups on their governments, with the threat of resorting to buyers’ clubs, given the huge differences in price and the selection processes put in place by national health insurances. For instance in France, the group SOS He´patites threatened the Ministry of Health in an open letter to resort to parallel imports if nothing was done in the shortest time possible: We made tests showing no difficulty to import generic treatment for individuals. We therefore imported such treatments. SOS He´patites is available for questions regarding further analysis. We are well aware that importing medicines is regulated by the law, and we know the risks of counterfeiting. This is your responsibility.13 The third aspect of this renewal was mentioned by an activist during an interview and shows that the fight for access to medicines is also pushed by newly emerging strategies: I think a lot of activists who are part of anti-HIV movements got institutionalized. They get so stuck on ‘quality issues’ that they cannot move. But new people are coming who have no idea about all these rules, and they say: ‘OK the medicines are available let’s go and get them’. And that’s what I really like about Hep C because a lot of us in the HIV movement are always waiting for the drugs to be prequalified by MSF or WHO before even offering to try to get it for persons who are dying. With Hep C these questions, the fear of quality and rules have disappeared and the new activists don’t conform to rules, because we have no time and we have to make choices now. (AIDS activist 2, interview) The last important point of renewal concerns growing interest in the question of importing only the active principle ingredients (and not the finished product) in order to compound the medicine by oneself. Greg Jefferys explains: Up until December 2015 [before the availability of Indian generics] a lot of people did take the Hep C API treatment option and imported APIs from China, mostly from Mesochem, a large company that specializes in making the APIs for all kinds of drugs, including Hep C medicines. Mesochem made the pure active ingredients; 99.9% pure Sofosbuvir and Ledipasvir and Daclatasvir.14 For these reasons, the organization of buyers’ clubs in the case of hepatitis C treatment gives ‘diversion’ as a mode of political engagement a particular and somehow new meaning. One central issue raised by the people involved in buyers’ clubs is that of diverting logistics. One activist told me he started sending Indian generic sofosbuvir abroad in September 2015. At the time of the interview in May 2016 he was sending about 100 treatments a month to patients around the world: in European countries, in South America, in Central Asia and so forth. He first mentioned very clearly the importance of logistical knowledge in such an activity: What helped me in running the buyers’ club is the work I have been doing in my former organization on the logistics of medicines, the knowledge I got there. And that helped me to go out and assist other patients too. (AIDS activist 3, interview) Most of the time he spent on the issue was dedicated to finding out: 1) how to organize the transit and deposit of money; 2) how a treatment could cross the borders of a country: For instance if you are asking from Serbia it can be difficult. But if you have a friend in Romania it’s easier: I can send the medicines there. Many Serbian people have friends in Romania, then they can come to Romania and go back. Because the custom officers will not allow the medicines alone to get in Serbia, even with a prescription. So I see with the Serbian patients if they have friends that can help them in Romania and then I send the packages. Getting the medicines to a given country also implies the ability of first getting them out of India, and therefore organizing shipments in order not to raise the customs’ interest: From where I am based now, we are getting from three ports. It goes through different customs officers and that is a very good point. I also segregated my parcels via different transporters in order to make them less visible. Most importantly, this logistical activity is definitely considered as a way of overcoming the restrictions imposed by the pharmaceutical firms and the governments: I told my family: ‘bear very clearly in mind that I am not dealing with narcotics. These are completely legal drugs. What we are fighting is the geographical restrictions which have been laid down by the Big Pharma. ...I know there are grey areas through which I’m working but it has to be done. Someone has to take the sword in his hands. It’s not possible to sit back and relax and to let the companies or the capitalists make the rules and regulations on who survives and who doesn’t.’ Patients abroad also become involved in these logistic issues, therefore participating in a collective movement. As my interlocutor explained: ‘My contacts are other people. For instance, in the UK, one hepatitis C patient came to know me via another friend and now he is arranging with other people from his country. It is similar in other countries.’ One can mention here the case of C, a French patient who received the treatment before the French government declared there would be universal access – a declaration followed in the first time only by an improvement in access and not by full coverage, as noted by Chabrol et al. (2017). C was 15 in 2013 when she was diagnosed with hepatitis C. She had to wait for two and a half years before getting the treatment, and she got weaker and very depressed. But she followed a lot of Hep C advocacy groups via multiple online forums. She learned about Greg Jefferys’ experience and decided to take it upon herself to obtain the medicines. First, her parents had to be convinced – since they were not keen on infringing the law and were cautious about the quality of medicines bought from abroad in an illegal way. Once C convinced them, she contacted someone via a forum and this person sent her the first part of the treatment from someone based in England. Only two-thirds of the treatment were available at the time, and so a few weeks later she travelled to Paris with her father and boyfriend to get the remainder of the treatment, from another person whose contact she got via a buyers’ club and who was a French national coming back to France after a journey to India (Hep C patient, interview). In this short story, diversion logistics are far from simple: medicines move in segments and follow different routes, and people have to be able to move to benefit from them. However, what remains is the idea that simultaneously these erratic trajectories recompose access conditions within the context of enclosed markets. The story of Greg Jefferys and the case of buyers’ clubs illustrate stimulating ways of engaging with logistic regimes. They underline the importance of locating protest within supply chains and distribution routes as an answer to the limitations imposed by the regimes. In this sense, trajectories matter as much as access per se. However, one should not overstate such individual or collective actions and thus underplay the importance of the state, which exists as another crucial level of critical engagement against the logistic regime. At the state level, we have seen earlier that Gilead had imposed prices given its strong position on the market. In a way, statism and capitalism cooperate together.

### 1NC---AT Langlois---Reductionism

#### Their critique of technological supremacy is reductive---there’s no systemic failure

Susen 19, Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Simon, “No escape from the technosystem?,” Philosophy & Social Criticism)

A major irony of Feenberg’s book is the following contradiction: on several occasions, he criticizes, and distances himself from, technological determinism; key parts of his argument suggest, however, that he himself flirts with, if not subscribes to, technological determinism. He rightly maintains, and convincingly demonstrates, that ‘society and technology are inextricably imbricated’.240 This insight justifies the underlying assumption that there is no comprehensive study of society without a critical sociology of technology. Yet, to contend that ‘[s]ocial groups exist through the technologies that bind their members together’241 is misleading. For not all social groups are primarily defined by the technologies that enable their members to relate to, and to bond with, one another. Indeed, not all social relations, or social bonds, are based on, let alone determined by, technology. Of course, Feenberg is right to argue that ‘technologically mediated groups influence technical design through their choices and protests’.242 Ultimately, though, the previous assertion is tautological. This becomes clear if, in the above sentence, we replace the word ‘technological(ly)’ with terms such as ‘cultural(ly)’, ‘linguistical(ly)’, ‘political(ly)’, ‘economic(ally)’, or indeed another sociological qualifier commonly used to characterize the specificity of a social relation. Hence, we may declare that ‘culturally, linguistically, politically, and economically mediated groups influence cultural, linguistic, political, and economic conventions through their choices and protests’. In saying so, we are stating the obvious. If, however, we aim to make a case for cultural, linguistic, political, or economic determinism, then this is problematic to the extent that we end up reducing the constitution of social arrangements to the product of one overriding causal set of forces (whether these be cultural, linguistic, political, economic, technological, or otherwise). While declaring that he is a critic of technological determinism, Feenberg – in central passages of his book – gives the impression that he is one of its fiercest advocates. Feenberg’s techno-Marxist evolutionism is based on the premise that ‘progress is realized essentially through technosystem change’243 – that is, on the assumption that, effectively, human progress is reducible to technological development. Feenberg is right to stress that ‘[t]echnical progress is joined indissolubly to the democratic enlargement of access to its benefits and protection from its harms’.244 ‘Concretization’,245 understood in this way, conceives of progress as a ‘local, context-bound phenomenon uniting technical and normative dimensions’.246 We may add, however, that progress has not only technical (or technological) but also economic, cultural, and political dimensions, which contain objective, normative, and subjective facets. At times, the differentiation between these aspects is blurred, if not lost, in Feenberg’s account, given his tendency to overstate the power of technology at the expense of other crucial social forces. In other words, progress is not only ‘inextricably entangled with the technosystem’,247 but it is also indissolubly entwined with the economic, cultural, and political systems in which it unfolds and for (or against) which it exerts its objective, normative, and subjective power. The preceding reflection takes us back to the problem of techno-reductionism: The struggle over the technosystem began with the labor movement. Workers’ demands for health and safety on the job were public interventions into production technology.248 All struggles over social (sub)systems have not only a technological but also various other (notably economic, cultural, and political) dimensions. Demands made by particular subjects (defined by class, ethnicity, gender, age, or ability – or a combination of these sociological variables) are commonly expressed in public interventions not only into production technology, but also into economic, cultural, and political systems. In all social struggles (including class struggle), technology can be an important means to an end, but it is rarely an end in itself. Put differently, social struggles are partly – but seldom essentially, let alone exclusively – about technology.

### 1NC---AT Beller---Crypto Turn

#### The 1ac Beller evidence calls for “taking the digital back” and “seizing the means of production” --- that’s Bitcoin. No take-backs, this is a review of a core 1ac author. Bitcoin turns the case.

Galloway 21, writer and computer programmer working on issues in philosophy, technology, and theories of mediation. Professor of Media, Culture, and Communication at New York University (Alexander, Review of “The World Computer,” Culture and Communication, <http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/the-world-computer>)

In other words I'm not convinced by Beller's proposal for “revolutionary finance,” a proposal taken up more fully at the end of the book. Beller cites the Economic Space Agency (ECSA) and recent attempts to develop crypto currencies. A number of theorists and computer scientists are also wrapped up in this movement, including Brian Massumi, the Deleuzian who recently published 99 Theses on the Revaluation of Value: A Postcapitalist Manifesto (which I discussed previously). For Beller, the prospect of revolutionary finance is part of an historical development toward the decentralization of authority: "Bitcoin...[is] part of an insurrectionary history of the decentralization of authority that includes the French Revolution, decolonization, suffrage, 8 mm film, the portapak, the cheap digital camera, and the easy access to publication on the World Wide Web" (243). Beller thinks that the redesign of economic media has something to offer social struggle. Still, he is nothing like a Bitcoin "maximalist," those staking it all on a technical miracle. Bitcoin “is not the revolution--far from it” (250), as Beller unambiguously puts it. Yet I suspect there is nothing inherently insurrectionary about decentralization--if by "insurrectionary" Beller means politically progressive--decentralization merely marking a shift in the architectonics of power that might favor reactionary tendencies as much as progressive ones. My own contribution to this debate as been around the question of "protocol," a network design style that is both decentralized and distributed, if not also collapsing more and more into centralization with each passing day. Is there a toxic form of money and a non-toxic form of money, our job being merely to distinguish between the two? Beller's book hinges on a political discrimination, where the "good" money is elevated over the bad. Yet if Marx bequeathed anything to us, it was the notion that the money-form itself is toxic. Money is extractive abstraction in hyperbolic form. The solution is not better money built on the blockchain. The solution is the suspension of the infrastructure of extractive abstraction. Indeed blockchain is an ecological abomination if not also a socio-political one; these machines should be nuked forthwith. At the same time Beller is motivated by a deeply Marxist instinct. For him cryptocurrencies offer an escape from the perils of leftist orthodoxy, a way to "get one's hands dirty" and engage in a critique of capital at the level of practice. How easy for Marxist academics to remain apart, above the fray, avoiding the hard work of organizing, building, and experimenting with new technologies. So while I disagree with Beller's attachment to cryptocurrencies, I certainly admire his commitment to praxis. And my argumentative tone regarding the book's conclusion is merely a testament to the evocative power of Beller's project overall, which I expect will find an eager readership.

#### Bitcoin turns the case at every level. It’s intrinsically violent, and can’t be “seized”

Holthaus 21, Climate journalist for The Phoenix (Eric, “Bitcoin is now worth $50,000 — and it's ruining the planet faster than ever,” <https://thephoenix.substack.com/p/bitcoin-is-now-worth-50000-and-its>)

x

What you might not have heard – and what I wrote about a couple of times (1, 2) the last time Bitcoin’s price surged three years ago – is that the massive computer network that created and maintains the Bitcoin system uses an incredibly huge amount of energy. Nothing fundamental has really changed since then. In fact, Bitcoin’s environmental footprint has gotten a whole lot worse. In 2021, most Bitcoin is produced – mined – in China by massive computer servers solving unnecessarily complex math problems where subsidized coal-fired power plants produce some of the cheapest energy in the world. It’s a not-unlikely coincidence that a huge amount of Bitcoin is mined in Xinjiang province, the same place where Uighur Muslim minorities have been inflicted with horrific human rights abuses mining the very same coal used to create Bitcoin. Not unlike the California Gold Rush craze of 1849, Bitcoin is deeply colonial, deeply extractive, and deeply damaging to the environment and marginalized people around the world. This privileged crypto-colonialism almost exclusively benefits white men and it’s happening at a moment when the escalating climate emergency is causing escalating chaos that better deserves our electricity and our attention. The most recent data, current as of February 17 from the University of Cambridge shows that Bitcoin is drawing about 13.62 Gigawatts of electricity, an annualized consumption of 124 Terawatt-hours – about a half-percent of the entire world’s total – or about as much as the entire country of Pakistan. Since most electricity used to mine Bitcoin comes from fossil fuels, Bitcoin produces a whopping 37 million tons of carbon dioxide annually, about the same amount as Switzerland does by simply existing. “It is really by design that Bitcoin consumes that much electricity,” Michel Rauchs, a Cambridge researcher told BBC’s Tech Tent podcast. “This is not something that will change in the future unless the Bitcoin price is going to significantly go down." By coincidence, this is also roughly the same amount of electricity currently offline in Texas creating one of the worst blackouts in US history and a humanitarian crisis. So… we can have a lottery ticket experiment in predatory capitalism, or we can literally have the electricity embodied in the entire annual activities of the 200 million person nation of Pakistan. So far, the nerds are choosing Bitcoin. The incredible hubris of converting cheap electricity into pretend digital money during the middle of a climate emergency is simply not justified by its theoretical benefits. When I pointed this out recently on Twitter, the tech bros pounced with all sorts of strange arguments like: BUT THE MILITARY USES ELECTRICITY TOO!! Like, duh. Bitcoin evangelists point to its potential for seamless and secure financial transactions at an incredibly low cost – essentially destroying the centralized banking industry and government control over money – paving the way for everything from stabilizing the economies of historically marginalized countries to digital voting. But Bitcoin is currently doing none of those things, and won’t be any time soon.

#### Bitcoin triggers devastating fossil fuel consumption and warming

Martin 21, FT's markets editor, having previously been capital markets editor and run fastFT, our breaking news service. Prior to the FT, she was at the Wall St Journal and Dow Jones. (Katie and Billy Nauman, “Bitcoin’s growing energy problem: ‘It’s a dirty currency’,” Financial Times, <https://www.ft.com/content/1aecb2db-8f61-427c-a413-3b929291c8ac>)

“Bitcoin alone consumes as much electricity as a medium-sized European country,” says Professor Brian Lucey at Trinity College Dublin. “This is a stunning amount of electricity. It’s a dirty business. It’s a dirty currency.” Economic authorities are starting to take notice. The European Central Bank on Wednesday described cryptoassets’ “exorbitant carbon footprint” as “grounds for concern”. In a paper earlier this month, Italy’s central bank said the eurozone’s payments system, Tips, had a carbon footprint 40,000 times smaller than that of bitcoin in 2019. Measuring precisely how dirty bitcoin is has become a cottage industry in itself. The latest calculation from Cambridge university’s Bitcoin Electricity Consumption index suggests that bitcoin mining consumes 133.68 terawatt hours a year of electricity — a best-guess tally that has risen consistently for the past five years. That places it just above Sweden, at 131.8TWh of electricity usage in 2020, and just below Malaysia, at 147.21TWh. The true figure for bitcoin could in fact be much higher; Cambridge’s extreme worst-case scenario calculation, based on miners using the least energy-efficient computers on the market as long as the process is still profitable, has peeled away from its central estimate sharply since November last year as the price of bitcoin has rocketed. The rationale: a rising bitcoin price attracts new miners, and also means that mining with older, less efficient equipment, makes financial sense. The higher price also means the machines producing bitcoin are forced to complete ever-tougher puzzles in search of their quarry. At the upper limit, bitcoin’s electricity consumption would be about 500TWh a year. The UK consumes 300TWh. About 65 per cent of the crypto mining comes from China, where coal makes up around 60 per cent of the energy mix. Naturally, there is space for disagreement on these statistics, and all studies on the issue accept elements of uncertainty. “There’s a lot of shades of grey,” says Michel Rauchs, a research affiliate who works on the Cambridge index. Rauchs points out that a slice of the mining in China comes from clean hydroelectric power, including with machines that are transported from the north to the south of the country on trucks each year in the wet season. That hydro power is not necessarily diverted from anywhere else; some of these power stations were founded for factories that no longer exist, Rauchs says. In those cases, “I don’t see that it’s necessarily a problem”, he adds. About 75 per cent of miners use some kind of renewable energy, Cambridge studies show, but renewables still account for less than 40 per cent of the total energy used. Some mining may also be conducted off-grid, making it harder to track. All this nuance makes a difference. Still, the possibility of global official intervention to cut the industry’s energy consumption is an “existential threat”, says Rauchs. Machines on overdrive Energy consumption on some scale is a feature, not a bug, of bitcoin — a digital currency launched by the pseudonymous Satoshi Nakamoto 12 years ago. Its detachment from the global financial and governmental system — still the most alluring feature for users seeking anonymity or wishing to bypass central banks — means it needs a new way to establish trust and security. It does this by awarding miners coins in return for intensive puzzle-solving on the blockchain, making it a so-called “proof of work” coin. The puzzles are sufficiently hard to prevent hackers and other nefarious actors from taking control of the network, and the faster that miners can submit random numbers into the bitcoin algorithm, the more likely they are to unlock the coins. This all demands powerful machines running at full tilt. Luckily for bitcoin miners with access to cheap energy and efficient machines, it is usually worth it. The price of bitcoin has dropped by about $30,000 apiece since the peak last month, but it has climbed by more than 200 per cent since late 2020 and more than 1,000 per cent since 2019. Bitcoin is not the only energy-intensive cryptocurrency, but it is by far the biggest. Others include litecoin, ether and the light-hearted but rapidly growing dogecoin — initially an internet joke based on a Shiba Inu dog. A March 2020 study by energy research journal Joule said bitcoin accounted for about 80 per cent of the market capitalisation of “proof of work” coins, of which an estimated 500 exist, and about two-thirds of the energy. “Understudied currencies add nearly 50 per cent on top of bitcoin’s energy hunger, which already alone may cause considerable environmental damage,” the study claimed. Some cryptocurrencies are seeking to shift to a less energy-intensive “proof of stake” model, where a system allocates coins to verifiers, akin to miners, who put up coins for collateral. In the event of fraud, verifiers stand to lose their stakes, establishing trust through this channel rather than through energy-intensive “work”. Ether, the cryptocurrency native to the ethereum blockchain network, has been working on a shift to this model for more than two years, but the project is dogged by technical difficulties. Musk has also dangled the possibility that he could back other coins with a lighter energy impact. A greener version of bitcoin is, in theory, possible. Bitcoin’s code could switch to a less energy-intensive consensus mechanism, whereby a new section of the blockchain ledger underlying the cryptocurrency would follow different rules. However, every miner would need to switch for the new path to work. Industry insiders say it is hard to imagine the entire bitcoin community, which is peppered with disagreements, lending support to such a plan. Other ideas, such as labelling individual bitcoins as clean or dirty depending on the energy used to mine them, would also be hard to verify, and create a two-tier bitcoin system that was likely to lack support. “Bitcoin could be the first inefficient version of a disruptive technology,” says Dr Larisa Yarovaya, a lecturer at Southampton university. “It should die for the common good of the planet and be replaced by a new model. It consumes more electricity than a country. All the rest is detail.” Yarovaya, a former Russian Paralympic swimmer, frequently fields criticisms of her analysis and motivations from bitcoin proponents. She is undeterred, however. “It’s common sense,” she says. “[The energy consumption] is not justifiable by the high price of bitcoin. It is a speculative asset. It does not create a substantial amount of employment. It’s not widely used for transactions.” Such concerns have not, however, sparked high-profile campaigning from environmental groups. Friends of the Earth, an advocacy group, says it is still getting to grips with the issue, as is Greenpeace, whose US arm started accepting bitcoin donations in 2014. After inquiries from the Financial Times, Greenpeace says it will now scrap the facility, which has not been heavily used. “As the amount of energy needed to run bitcoin became clearer, this policy became no longer tenable,” says Greenpeace. Validation concerns Environmental concerns have also not deterred a clutch of investment banks from entering the sector, despite their public commitments to sustainable development goals: Citigroup said recently it was exploring what role it could play in crypto services; Goldman Sachs has reopened bitcoin derivatives trading; and Morgan Stanley plans to offer clients access to bitcoin funds. None of these banks wished to comment on the issue of energy consumption. Yarovaya says public companies dabbling in cryptocurrencies have served to “validate” the asset class, pumping up prices and in turn indirectly cranking up the energy usage. “They need to explain themselves,” she says, adding that cryptocurrency buyers should also take individual responsibility for their contribution. Nigel Topping, who was appointed by the UK government to co-ordinate with businesses over climate goals ahead of the COP26 talks later this year, says bitcoin is not likely to be on the agenda for climate discussions among governments in Glasgow, but it is starting to become a real issue in broader policy discussions. “It’s becoming one of the climate baddies,” he says. “People who care about climate are in a bit of dismay. It’s just a silly idea. Proof of work is proof of burning [fossil fuels]. It’s working directly against what we’re trying to do.”

Chart

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#### Fossil fuel emissions disproportionately affect Black communities.

Johnson and Stokes 7/13/2020 – “Our racist fossil fuel energy system. The fossil fuel economy is killing Black Americans.” – Nikayla Jefferson is a member of the Sunrise Movement in San Diego. Leah C. Stokes is an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. – https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/07/13/opinion/our-racist-fossil-fuel-energy-system/ – Spavs

American society is rife with racial inequities. Black people are 2.5 times more likely to be killed by police and five times more likely to be incarcerated than whites. But it’s not just the US criminal justice system that’s a problem: Our fossil fuel energy system is fundamentally racist. If you want to run a society on fossil fuels, you’re going to need sacrifice zones — places where the air is thick with pollution and where climate impacts can be ignored. The last time someone counted, 68 percent of Black Americans lived within 30 miles of a coal-fired plant. Many of these facilities, particularly across the South, are more expensive to run than is clean energy. Yet utilities like Southern Company keep their super polluting, uneconomic coal-fired plants open, no matter the costs for Black communities, simply because it’s in their financial interest. These decisions shorten Black lives. Research shows that white communities are exporting their pollution into Black backyards. As a result, Black children have asthma rates that are twice as high as white children. We’ve seen the consequences of this pollution burden in stark terms during the COVID-19 pandemic — it’s a key contributor to Black Americans’ higher death rate. The more scientists look, the more evidence they find: Our fossil fuel economy is killing Black Americans every day. New research shows that pregnant Black women are twice as likely to have stillborn babies than white mothers because of their unequal exposure to air pollution and heat waves. Climate change is already hitting Black communities the hardest. As we recently wrote in a report for Stacey Abrams’s think tank, Southern Economic Advancement Project, communities across the Southeast are on the front lines of flooding, sea-level rise, hurricanes, and heat waves. The scientific evidence is overwhelming: Pollution, climate impacts, and police violence all fall hardest on Black communities. But scientific facts have never stopped fossil fuel companies from denying the truth. Faced with increasing attention on racial justice, one fossil fuel company decided once again to lie to the public. As one report revealed, Chevron responded to the growing movement for racial justice by funding a PR campaign that claimed, “White environmentalists are hurting black communities by pushing radical climate policies that would strip them of fossil fuel jobs.” They advanced a false argument that addressing our fossil fuel pollution would “bring particular harm to minority communities.” As Harvard professor Naomi Oreskes responded: “There’s no socially acceptable language to describe how despicable this is.” In California, another fossil fuel company tried to take advantage of the fight for racial injustice to protect dirty energy. As Emily Aitken reported, a marketing firm linked to SoCalGas circulated fake reports that the NAACP opposed a plan for clean energy. This is the exact same tactic that fossil fuel companies used to try to block federal climate policy back in 2009. Make no mistake: Fossil fuel companies need to tell lies about the costs that their dirty infrastructure imposes on Black communities. Because if we understood the truth, and if we valued Black lives, there will be nowhere for the fossil fuel plants to go. And that wouldn’t just be a good thing for Black communities. It would also help Indigenous peoples, Latinx communities, and white Americans too. This is because the Movement for Black Lives is part of a long tradition of protecting all lives on this planet. At the first Earth Day in 1970, Wilbur Thomas, a Black environmental justice leader, spoke out about the racist policies driving pollution into Black communities. Today, support for climate action is higher among Black Americans, who are also more supportive of a Green New Deal. Ending the fossil fuel era would save Black lives. And it would also save Americans from all walks of life who are sick of breathing dirty air, fleeing wildfires, and hunkering down for the latest hurricane. It’s time to face facts. If Americans are sincere that Black lives matter, the fossil fuel era must end. Just as we cannot accept a world where Black Americans’ final words at the hands of the police are “I can’t breathe,” we cannot accept a world where our fossil fuel dependence poisons Black communities, so that every day across our country, Black Americans can’t breathe.

#### Warming magnifies settler impositions

Whyte 16. Kyle Powys Whyte, Michigan State University Timnick Chair in the Humanities, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Community Sustainability In Press. “Is it Colonial Déjà Vu? Indigenous Peoples and Climate Injustice” November 2016. . Humanities for the Environment: Integrating Knowledges, Forging New Constellations of Practice. Edited by Joni Adamson, Michael Davis, and Hsinya Huang. Earthscan Publications. Pages 88-104. ckm-eg.

Climate change fits succinctly within this pattern. For this reason, many contemporary Indigenous peoples are concerned about their vulnerability, or susceptibility to be harmed, by impacts associated with the observed rise of global average temperature, or climate change. That is, they are concerned about climate risks as they are increasingly confronted by change stemming from the carbon intensive economic activities of settler and other colonial societies. Climate change impacts can be seen through the lens of forms of containment (among other forms of domination), this time arising from settler contributions to increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Warming waters and receding glaciers affect the fish habitats in Indigenous territories all over the world, such as on the Pacific coast of North America where many Tribal nations harvest salmon for economic and cultural purposes (Bennett et al.). Sea level rise is pushing people living in the Village of Kivalina in Alaska, the Isle de St. Charles in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Carteret Atoll in Papua New Guinea to relocate (Maldonado et al.). In these cases we see 8 both shrinking habitats and relocation occurring again. The Loita Maasai peoples in Africa face droughts that affect the rain conditions required for performing many of their ceremonies (Saitabu). Indigenous women, girls and two spirit persons in the Arctic and Great Plains regions are subject to greater sexual violence, abuse and trafficking as work camps for oil and gas extraction, such as ‘fracking,’ bring in male contractors to profit from the resources found within Indigenous territories (Sweet). Climate change impacts and drivers represent another form of inflicted anthropogenic environmental change. Scientific reports confirm many of the threats just described. In 2014, the U.S. National Climate Assessment states that Indigenous peoples face the ‘loss of traditional knowledge in the face of rapidly changing ecological conditions, increased food insecurity… changing water availability, Arctic sea ice loss, permafrost thaw, and relocation from historic homeland’ (Bennett et al. 2). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report claims Indigenous peoples face ‘challenges to post-colonial power relations, cultural practices, their knowledge systems, and adaptive strategies’ (Adger et al.). Indigenous peoples’ own descriptions of climate risk indicate that settler and other colonial societies are imposing rapid environmental change that generates otherwise preventable harms. The Mandaluyong Declaration quotes Miskito women in the Americas who say, in response to changing environmental conditions, that “We now live in a hurry and daughters do not cook as grandmothers… We do not catch fish as before, do not cook as before; we cannot store food and seeds as before; the land no longer produces the same; small rivers are drying up… I think that along with the death of our rivers, our culture dies also.” (300-01). For many Indigenous peoples, these rapid changes are experienced as a continuation of settler colonialism and other forms of colonialism that they have endured for many years. For we have experienced these types of environmentally-related impacts before— from dietary change to relocation to sexual violence—though caused by different factors, such as multiple settler institutions of containment. Though institutions of containment represent just one limited example of a much more complex history with settler colonialism. Anthropogenic climate change is of a piece with forms of nonconsensual and harmful environmental change inflicted on our societies in the past. Some Indigenous peoples look at futures of 9 rampant climate injustice as looking to the cyclical history of settler and other colonial inflictions of anthropogenic environmental change on Indigenous peoples in order to instantiate erasure. Yet what is more insidious about climate injustice against Indigenous peoples is that the settler institutions such as those of containment, that inflicted environmental change in the past, are the same institutions that fostered carbon-intensive economic activities on Indigenous territories. That is, containment strategies, such as removal of Indigenous peoples to reservations or the forced adoption of corporate government structures, all facilitated extractive industries, deforestation and large-scale agriculture. What is more, and as I will discuss in more detail in later sections, these are the same institutions that today make it hard for many Indigenous peoples to effectively cope with climate change impacts. In this way, climate injustice against Indigenous peoples refers to the vulnerability caused by ongoing, cyclical colonialism both because institutions facilitate carbon-intensive economic activities that produce adverse impacts while at the same time interfering with Indigenous people’s capacity to adapt to the adverse impacts

# 2NC

## K

### ! overview framing

**Communicative capitalism makes violence inevitable**

**Wiltgen 5**

(James Wiltgen, Professor of History and Critical Theory at CalArts, "Sado-Moneatrism or Saint Fond – Saint Ford", in Consumption in the Age of Information, ed. Cohen and Rutsky, BERG, New York, p. 107-110)

How does digital capitalism intertwine with the concept of uncertainty? What key changes have taken place in the structuring of the world, via the digital and the biotechnological, what forces have emerged or coalesced, and ﬁnally, how do they affect the realm of subjectivity and consumption? Here, Arthur Kroker has transposed McLuhan into the twenty-ﬁrst century, performing an interrogation of what he calls the “digital nerve,” basically the exteriorization of the human sensorium into the digital circuitry of contemporary capitalism (Kroker, 2004: 81). This (in)formation, “streamed capitalism,” rests not exclusively on exchange value, nor material goods, but something much more immaterial, – a post market, post biological, post image society where the driving force, the “will to will,” has ushered in a world measured by probability. In other words, this variant of capitalism seeks to bind chaos by ever-increasing strictures, utilizing an axiomatic based on capture and control, with vast circuits of circulation as the primary digital architecture. This system runs on a densely articulated composition, similar to the earlier addressed concept of sado-monetarism, based upon extensive feedback loops running between exchange value and abuse value. This assemblage, however, has multiple levels, and not all are connected to the grid at the same speeds; a number of different times exist within this formation, including digital time, urban time, quotidian time, transversal time, etc. Spatially, the structure relies not on geography but “strategic digital nodes” for the core of the system, and connectivity radiates out from these nodal points (Kroker, 2004: 125). For example, a key site for these points would be the Net corporation, deﬁned as “as a self-regulating, self- reﬂexive platform of software intelligence providing a privileged portal into the digital universe” (Kroker, 2004: 140). Indeed, his mapping of digital capitalism has clear parallels with the shifts Katherine Hayles analyzes, in particular the underlying, driving mechanism whereby information severs itself from embodiment. Boredom and acquisitiveness become the principle markers of this new form of capitalism, which provides a rationale, or a new value set for the perpetual oscillation between the two poles, producing an insatiable desire for both objects and a continuing stream of fresh and intense experience. Perhaps the most densely argued assessment of capitalism, whose obvious parallel would be Marx’s Capital, is the two volumes by Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. With all the concern over the theoretical concepts developed in these books, it remains extremely important to understand the analysis as possessing a fundamental focus on the question of political economy. Capitalism forms, via its structural and affective matrix, a system capable of unparalleled cruelty and terror, and even though certain indices of well being have increased, “exploitation grows constantly harsher, (and) lack is arranged in the most scientiﬁc ways” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 373). Their framework for analysis targets the global, where the deepest law of capitalism sets limits and then repels those limits, a process well known as the concept of deterrorialization. Capitalism functions, then, by incessantly increasing the portion of constant capital, a deceptively concise formulation that has tremendous resonance for the organization of the planet – resources continually pour into the technological and machinic apparatus of capture and control, to the increased exclusion of the human component (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 466–7). In other words, it not only thrives on crisis but one of the principle deﬁnitions of capitalism would be to continually induce crisis; nostalgia for a “lost Sado-Monetarism or Saint Fond-Saint Ford 109 time” only drives these processes. The planet confronts the fourth danger, the most violent and destructive of tendencies, characterized as a turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion of abolition (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 229). Deleuze and Guattari make clear this fourth danger does not translate as a death drive, because for them desire is “always assembled,” a creation and a composition; here the task of thinking becomes to address the processes of composition. The current assemblage, then, has mutated from its original organization of total war, which has been surpassed “toward a form of peace more terrifying still,” the “peace of Terror or Survival” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 433). Accordingly, the worldwide war machine has entered a post fascist phase, where Clausewitz has been dislocated, and this war machine now targets the entire world, its peoples and economies. An “unspeciﬁed enemy” becomes the continual feedback loop for this war machine, which had been originally constituted by states, but which has now shifted into a planetary, and perhaps interstellar mode, with a seemingly insatiable drive to organize insecurity, increase machinic enslavement, and produce a “peace that technologically frees the unlimited material process of total war” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467).7 Deleuze has analyzed these tendencies extensively in his own work, in particular with his dissection of active and reactive forces in his book on Nietzsche but also in his work on Sade and Masoch, where he points to a type of sadism that seems capable of attempting a “perpetually effective crime,” to not only destroy (pro)creation but to prevent it from ever happening again, a total and perpetual destruction, one produced by a pervasive odium fati, a hatred of fate that seeks absolute revenge in destroying life and any possible recurrence. (Deleuze, 1989: 37). This tendency far outstrips what Robert Jay Lifton has described as the “Armageddonists,” in their more commonly analyzed religious variant and in what he calls the secular type, both of which see the possibility of a “world cleansing,” preparing the way for a new world order, be it religious or otherwise (Lifton, 1987: 5–9). Embedded within the immanence of capitalism, then, one can ﬁnd forces which would make fascism seem like “child precursors,” and Hitler’s infamous Telegram 71 would be applied to all of existence, perpetually. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 467). One ﬁnal complication in terms of currently emerging subjectivities, the well-known analysis in Anti-Oedipus where capitalism, as basically driven by a certain fundamental insanity, oscillates between “two poles of delirium, one as the molecular schizophrenic line of escape, and the other as paranoiac molar investment” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983: 315).8 These two markers offer dramatically different possibilities for the issues of subjectivities and agency, and questions of consumption and the political can be posed within their dense and complex oscillations.

### 2NC-AT: In not off

#### Using a University forum to call for decolonization is to reify a colonialist institution

Mayorga et al 19 Edwin Mayorga is Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Studies and the Program in Latín American and Latino Studies at Swarthmore College Lekey Leidecker is a Tibetan living in diaspora. Raised in Kentucky, she now lives on Piscataway lands. She holds a degree in Educational Studies and Sociology/Anthropology, but hopes you will look past that, Daniel Orr de Gutiérrez is a K-12 educator in Northern California. He holds a B.A. in Native Education from Swarthmore College and an M.A. in Teaching from the University of San Francisco. , Burn it Down: The Incommensurability of the University and Decolonization, Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis 2019, Vol. 8, No. 1, 87-106, <file:///C:/Users/sharris/Downloads/jctp-8029-mayorga.pdf>

We are led to believe that the university could be decolonized. In these appeals, the university is imagined as a force for the decolonial project, even becoming its primary vehicle. But the goals of the two are fundamentally incompatible, making it impossible to incorporate one into the other. Decolonization dislocates the colonial, divests its power from indigenous life. The university on the other hand, birthed by colonialism, is an essential agent of extant colonial violence, both materially, in extracting, accumulating, and withholding resources from marginalized communities, and epistemically, in monopolizing legitimate knowledges. It is dedicated to global colonization, to salvaging and defining settler futurity, through the construction of knowledge itself. Indigenous self-determination is not a possibility in either its political project or its conception of reality. To decolonize the university would, therefore, contradict its ideological purpose and impede its essential practice. Thus, we know that these decolonial appeals are hollow. Our own experiences and studies, as well as the histories and struggles of our communities, make it clear that the university could never be an agent of decolonization as long as this essential colonialist purpose remains intact. In fact, survivance will always be inhibited as long as an institution like the university has the authority to control and define our existence. As such, indigenous futurity depends upon eliminating these colonial agendas, so that we might imagine ways to look, live, and strive beyond them. And yet, it is both

### 2NC- Alt

#### We should burn it down and take the streets

Mayorga et al 19 Edwin Mayorga is Assistant Professor in the Department of Educational Studies and the Program in Latín American and Latino Studies at Swarthmore College Lekey Leidecker is a Tibetan living in diaspora. Raised in Kentucky, she now lives on Piscataway lands. She holds a degree in Educational Studies and Sociology/Anthropology, but hopes you will look past that, Daniel Orr de Gutiérrez is a K-12 educator in Northern California. He holds a B.A. in Native Education from Swarthmore College and an M.A. in Teaching from the University of San Francisco. , Burn it Down: The Incommensurability of the University and Decolonization, Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis 2019, Vol. 8, No. 1, 87-106, <file:///C:/Users/sharris/Downloads/jctp-8029-mayorga.pdf>

Although the university cannot be salvaged—given how thoroughly it is defined by coloniality—it has engorged itself on the material and intellectual resources of indigenous peoples around the world, and these resources are worthy of preservation. Those of us with all the benefits and privileges of a college degree, best able to access those resources, are responsible for moving them back into the communities they came from, in an enriching and sustaining manner. This repatriation is not a “sharing” of university resources, which would engender relationships of dependency. Rather, it is theft, using the university’s own property to enable communities to thrive independent of the institution. While each of us possesses unique skills and capacities, if you are not leveraging your position in some manner to contribute to this theft, you are helping to maintain the settler colonial university. That is why we say loot the bookshelves and burn the school down.

# 1NR

# 1NR---Round 4

## Case---BTC

### 1NR---Link

#### Beller---

we have to take down, or at least outflank, “the digital”

we might take the digital back, a taking back that implies new forms of revolutionary acting and a seizing of the means of production

This economy cannot be left to capital, to its technologies (as fixed capital), its media, or its money.

### ---xt: Crypto

#### Fossil fuel plants would shut down absent bitcoin adoption

Spegele 21 (Brian, “Bitcoin Miners Are Giving New Life to Old Fossil-Fuel Power Plants,” Wall Street Journal, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-miners-are-giving-new-life-to-old-fossil-fuel-power-plants-11621594803>)

Across America, older fossil-fuel power plants are shutting down in favor of renewable energy. But some are getting a new lease on life—to mine bitcoin. In upstate New York, an idled coal plant has been restarted, fueled by natural gas, to mine cryptocurrency. A once-struggling Montana coal plant is now scaling up to do the same.

### Tech Good---Climate

#### Planet-scale computation is necessary to combat climate change

Joppa 19, PhD, scientist in the Computational Ecology and Environmental Sciences Group (Lucas, “A Planetary Computer to Avert Environmental Disaster,” Scientific American, <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-planetary-computer-to-avert-environmental-disaster/>)

If environmental reports published this year were connected to an alarm system, the sound inside the United Nation's Manhattan headquarters would be deafening—we are facing a five-alarm fire. Myriad reports warned us we must take immediate action to ensure a sustainable supply of clean food, water and air to a human population projected to rapidly grow to 10 billion, all while stemming a globally catastrophic loss of biodiversity and averting the worst economic impacts of a changing climate. The news was devastating, but not unexpected. The specificity around the short window of time to act was, however. The world's leading environmental scientists have spoken, and the message is clear: The best time to act was yesterday, so we better start today. The task is much bigger and time is way shorter than previously thought. While the science says we very likely have no more than 420 gigatons of carbon left to spend, emissions steadily continue to rise every year. Just last year, over 42 gigatons was emitted. That gives us no more than 10 years before we must begin to operate as a carbon neutral planet. Unfortunately, discussions and commitments have yet to translate into measurable change. And change we must. At stake is not only the health of our planet, but the incredible social and economic progress seen across the world for at least the past 150 years. It's not surprising that many found themselves glumly nodding in agreement to Jonathan Franzen's recent article in the New Yorker, titled "What If We Stopped Pretending?" But fatalism never solved a problem. What does is a formula that has been repeated over centuries of human society—when faced with existential challenges, we have successfully and consistently tackled major societal problems through the simple summation of hard work, progressive governance and technological innovation. This ideal is what we must embrace in the era of climate change. While people are mobilizing and governments are meeting, what is missing is the third leg of the stool. Investment in technology solutions aimed at environmental outcomes is sorely needed to accelerate the pace, scale and effectiveness of our response to climate change. The epitome of the innovation we need is best understood as a "planetary computer." A planetary computer will borrow from the approach of today's internet search engines, and extend beyond them in the form of a geospatial decision engine that supports queries about the environmental status of the planet, programmed with algorithms to optimize its health. Think of this less as a giant computer in a stark white room and more of an approach to computing that is planetary in scale and allows us to query every aspect of environmental and nature-based solutions available in real time. We currently lack the data, compute power and scalability to do so. Only when we have a massive amount of planetary data and compute at a similar scale can we begin to answer one of the most complex questions ever posed—how do we manage the earth's natural resources equitably and sustainably to ensure a prosperous and climate-stable future? The game-changing potential of this approach is clear, not only for fighting climate change but building a better future for us all. That is not just the hope of an environmental scientist with a background in computer science but borne out by research. A recent report by PwC United Kingdom found that applying AI in just a few areas could boost global GDP by 4.4 percent while lowering emissions by 4 percent. The Global Commission on Adaptation found that investment in adaptation measures would not only avoid human suffering and economic loss, it would bring benefits that outweigh the costs nearly four to one. The incredible benefits from these nature-based mitigation and adaptation solutions and AI-enabled transformations can only be realized with planetary data and computer power. That will require us to quickly take the three accelerants of the information age—ubiquity of data, advances in algorithms, and access to scalable computing infrastructure—and begin, for the first time in many instances, to apply them to our natural world. The gap in application and deployment becomes clear as we look at a few key nature-based solutions. Consider forests for carbon sequestration. We should be able to answer how many trees there are, where they are, and how fast they are appearing or disappearing. The same goes for species conservation, or healthy freshwater lakes or the rate of sea level rise in a granular sense of space and time. Right now, at best, we have very limited answers at a resolution that is far too broad geographically and for only a few points in time, and far less data for many other nature datasets. The world desperately needs better answers. We cannot create a blueprint of action to give us the world and environmental services we want and need without it. With a planetary computer using planetary data, we can ask—and answer—questions such as, What services can or should we obtain from different places on the earth? en route to a day where we can describe what we want for our future and how to get there. A planetary computer is an ambitious idea. It will require us to build a global network that connects billions, or trillions, of datapoints about our environment with the computing power and machine learning tools to process them into actionable insights that will empower decision makers in every corner of the globe to put sustainability first. And although parts of this plan may seem like science fiction, it could be a reality in the near future.

### ---xt: Super-Computer Good

#### Planetary computation is key to limit resource consumption and fight climate change. It weeds out ineffective solutions and allows a fast scale-up of technologies that have proven to work

Davis 20, environmental analyst (Matt, “3 ways quantum computing can help us fight climate change,” Big Think, <https://bigthink.com/technology-innovation/quantum-computers-climate-change?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1>)

Part of what makes fighting climate change so hard is that solutions take years or even decades to develop.

Meanwhile, the amount of CO2 already in the atmosphere means that climate change has momentum on its side, and its effects are already being felt.

However, quantum computing would represent a breakthrough that could cut down on the time needed to research and develop solutions exponentially, turning the work of decades into years or less.

Without a doubt, climate change is the most pressing and complicated challenge that humanity collectively faces. Dealing with it appropriately will require a lot—we'll need to change our lifestyles to put less stress on the planet, consume more conscientiously, and more diligently preserve species diversity. But we may be able to innovate our way out of this terrific mess we've found ourselves in. One way to do that would be to make scalable, efficient quantum computers.

Developing quantum computing capacities at a scale similar to modern computers or even supercomputers could enable us to solve many of the intractable problems that climate change poses to us. Here's how.

What is quantum computing?

At the fundamental level, classical computers use bits to operate, simple pieces of binary information that can have two values: 0 or 1. Quantum computers take advantage of quantum particles' weird ability to exist in several states simultaneously. Rather than represent a 0 or 1, a "qubit" can exist as both simultaneously.

Imagine you have four bits. Together, those four bits can have one of 16 possible combinations, such as 1011. Four qubits, however, can be in all 16 combinations at once. As more qubits get involved, these potential values grow exponentially, meaning that our computing power grows exponentially as well.

There's quite a bit more involved, but the important thing to know is that quantum computers absolutely smoke classical computers when solving complicated problems. Some problems exist that would take a classical computer literally millions of years to solve that a quantum computer could solve in days or less. Solving these problems are the ones that are going to help us address climate change.

1. Deploying better CO2-scrubbing compounds

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that cutting CO2 emissions isn't enough to stop climate change; we'll need to remove the CO2 that's already in the atmosphere. To a large extent, we can accomplish this by planting more trees, but this isn't a perfect solution. Trees take a long time to grow (and sequester carbon in so doing), can be prone to fires (which will become more common as the Earth warms), and are tempting targets for logging (which emits CO2).

Using chemical catalysts to capture CO2 for storage or to convert it into useful products is one way to overcome this. But existing catalysts tend to be made of expensive materials or are difficult to deploy. It'd be a huge step if we could identify cheaper, easier-to-make compounds that can scrub CO2 from the atmosphere more effectively.

But here, we run into a problem. Accurately simulating chemical compounds takes a lot of processing power. Every atom added to a compound makes simulation exponentially more difficult, requiring us to use our best guesses in a tedious trial and error process instead. Currently, quantum computers can simulate simple compounds with a few dozen qubits. Experts claim that if we could scale that up to around a million qubits, we would likely be able to simulate the compounds that are likely to be more effective at capturing CO2.

2. Developing better batteries

Almost every aspect of renewable energy technology is mature enough to replace traditional fossil fuels right now, save for one major stumbling block: battery technology. Fossil fuels function as a stable store by themselves, ready to undergo combustion to release the energy stored in gasoline or coal. But the pure electricity generated from solar energy or the turning of wind turbines needs to be stored somewhere, especially since the wind isn't always blowing and the sun isn't always shining.

Current batteries, however, are too expensive to implement at the scale needed to store the world's energy needs, and they don't store energy long enough. Like CO2-scrubbing catalysts, advances in battery technology are made through physical prototyping and testing. Using a quantum computer to simulate the complicated chemistry that hypothetically better batteries would employ would make this process many, many times faster.

This approach has attracted significant attention since batteries are such a widely used commodity. One notable example of first-movers in this arena is Mercedes-Benz, who has partnered with IBM's quantum computing program in order to build better batteries for electric cars.

3. Modeling the Earth's climate

The Earth's climate is an enormously complicated system with numerous sensitive components that interact with one another. Our current understanding of climate change is the result of decades of modeling work from thousands of researchers, and thanks to that work, we know what components of the Earth's climate system pose the greatest risk, what we need to focus on, and when we need to act.

Understanding the climate informs our strategy and enables us to make better forecasts. At 2018's SXSW conference, tech entrepreneur William Hurley suggested that quantum computing's exponentially superior computing power could be used to model the many, many variables that go into the Earth's climate system.

There are many more known applications of quantum computing that could benefit us in our fight against climate change. Odds are, there's even more unknown applications that we'll only discover once we begin playing around with this new technology.

#### Supercomputer-driven solutions to climate change lead to effective action. The public will leverage predictions to take evidence-based actions that solve resource over-consumption

Paulsen 20, helped launch many industry-firsts including HAMR technology, 10K-rpm and 15K-rpm hard drives, drives designed specifically for video and for gaming, Serial ATA drives, fluid dynamic HDD motors, 60TB SSDs, and MACH.2 multi-actuator technology. (John, “Attack the Climate Crisis with Exascale Supercomputing,” https://blog.seagate.com/human/attack-the-climate-crisis-with-exascale-supercomputing/)

To understand the complex interactions of many planetary factors — including the effects of self-reinforcing positive feedback loops that amplify impacts and trigger further abrupt changes — requires that we deploy enormous analytical power on huge and always-growing data sets. It’s an urgent and daunting task. Imagine fitting the entire planet inside a computer. Using the world’s fastest supercomputers and big data models, climate scientists are creating computer models of the Earth’s air, water, and land systems at a global scale. Recreating the climate inside a computer Countries, companies, and communities are already benefiting from this scale model of the Earth. “It’s allowing us to do work that was science fiction a year ago,” said Dan Jacobson, chief scientist for Computational Systems Biology at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Jacobson is referring to the Summit, the world’s fastest supercomputer. The machine operates at exascale levels and its power is undeniable. Summit is capable of running close to three billion billion calculations per second. It recently performed a massive climate simulation in a matter of three hours; on a more typical system this data crunching would have taken 133 years to complete, according to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. For climate scientists, the value of this kind computing power means new modeling possibilities. Data from the IPCC special report on impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, showing projected effects based on emissions. Click the image to see the report. The climate is a notoriously hard nut to crack — particularly when it comes to creating precision models. Global systems include the interplay of water, temperature, atmospheric gasses, and sunlight, among thousands of dynamic and variable factors. That makes it extraordinarily difficult to forecast the weather in a month, let alone to predict precise changes over decades. But exascale supercomputing has given researchers an edge. These machines, in effect, compute complex climate interactions through sheer brute force. Researchers input every factor of the planet’s climate — 25- to 100-kilometer sections of Earth’s ocean, atmosphere, and land — as single data points. Then, using sophisticated, high-resolution models, supercomputers can analyze billions upon billions of interactions between these data points simultaneously, across the entire planet. By precisely replicating global climate conditions, these models offer a better understanding of the mechanisms of climate change — and account for everything from changes in atmospheric pressure and ice melt, to regional fluctuations in precipitation patterns and water temperature. Most importantly, they can predict future changes with unprecedented speed, scale, and precision. This new computing power offers the closest thing that scientists have to a full-scale model of Earth’s climate. Already, the research is providing invaluable answers to our most pressing climate questions, such as the future impact of climate change on our communities, infrastructure, and energy use. Tangible benefits of climate supercomputing As the value of next-generation supercomputing becomes clear, research institutions around the world are developing their own next-gen machines to tackle climate science. For instance, researchers at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NSCA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA), the Barcelona Supercomputing Centre, and the Argonne National Laboratory are using supercomputers to model the effects of energy production on global temperature, the intensity of hurricanes and tropical cyclones, and the impact of extreme weather on our infrastructure. U.S. weather forecasting centers are already benefiting from supercomputing science. NOAA, which provides forecasts for extreme weather, recently installed new supercomputers at its U.S. data centers. The processing boost allows NOAA to run its next-generation forecast model, the Global Forecast System, farther into the future and at higher resolution — to 16 days out, from a previous 10 days, and at 9km resolution, from 13km. This improvement may sound marginal, but it provides weather forecasters and emergency response services with a vastly improved ability to keep the public informed and to effectively deliver critical aid during a disaster. Meanwhile communities and companies are also benefiting from the research. For instance, telecom giant AT&T — which has spent $843 million since 2016 on disaster recovery — recently partnered with the Argonne National Laboratory to predict the impact of extreme weather on its cellular equipment. While previous-generation computers could only capture results at a resolution of 100km (62 miles) — too broad for analyzing, say, the impact of flooding on a city — the Argonne supercomputer narrowed-down its predictions to a resolution of just 12km (7.5 miles), and a mere 200 meters (656 feet) for flooding data. As regional climate patterns change, computations like these provide service providers with an unprecedented ability to protect vital telecom infrastructure — like buried fiber optic cables. In general, supercomputers offer the possibility to help us develop solutions to reduce the degree of climate change Earth faces, and also to minimize the massive toll of extreme weather on our economy and infrastructure. In the U.S., fluctuations in weather account for an astounding variation of 3 percent and 6 percent in our annual GDP — a $1.3 trillion swing — and in 2018, extreme weather resulted in roughly $80 billion in damages. With more accurate forecasts and better climate projections, government officials and corporations can help mitigate those costs and ready our cities for weather-related challenges. Responding to the impacts that we fail to prevent Supercomputing research also promises to inform how the U.S and the international community respond to changes in climate in the future. While climate scientists understand the big-picture dynamics of climate change, supercomputers will help to refine their analyses. The result: more accurate climate predictions, along with deep insights into the complex interplay between humans, organisms, energy, and the environment. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, for instance, is conducting research with Summit into how regional environmental shifts could impact the sustainability of our food supply — assessing how certain crops and plants react and adapt to changing conditions like temperature and water and nutrient availability. Such research could inform the practice of precision agriculture, where scientists bioengineer plants to thrive in changing environments. Just as importantly, the Oak Ridge research will also study how climate change relates to the possible spread of human and biological disease. Researchers believe that once-isolated illnesses are likely to thrive in changing regional environments. Among the foremost of research concerns is the possible future impact on energy production. Research from the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Energy Exascale Earth System Model (E3SM) will explore just that — including the two-way dynamic between natural and human activities. For instance, E3SM researchers at the Las Alamos National Laboratory will assess how fluctuations in regional temperature could strain local energy grids, as well as how changing water availability could impact the output of hydroelectric and nuclear power plants. Similarly, researchers will examine the impact that extreme water cycle events, like flooding, droughts, and sea level rise, could have on critical coastal infrastructure. The long-term goal of the DOE: to determine how, and where, U.S. energy policy will need to adapt to a changing climate. What can I do about the Climate Crisis? Outside of research institutions, most consumers — and even most business leaders — will never get their hands on a supercomputing climate simulation. But research supported by super-computing is already reshaping the world around them. Citizens can leverage the knowledge and predictions from the research to pressure their governments and large companies and organizations to take direct action in the most effective and targeted ways based on the evidence, in the face of specific predicted catastrophic impacts to humanity. And the results of the research is sure to influence the global response to the impacts of climate change, and to inform worldwide strategies that policymakers can pursue to keep the planet habitable. Climate change presents a significant and very concerning set of complex challenges for every citizen in the global community. As advances in supercomputing continue to expand, my hope is that key stakeholders in the climate fight — researchers, governments, corporate entities, and the public — will be better informed, and more prepared, to take stronger and smarter action and put effective solutions in place.

### K of Beller’s Computational metaphor

#### Beller’s computational metaphor for the attention economy is premised on flawed understandings of how information is consumed

Woods 20 Alastair Woods Submitted to OCAD University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Design (MDes) in Strategic Foresight & Innovation 2020, Attention Seeking: Distraction as a Cultural Dilemma in the Digital Age, <http://openresearch.ocadu.ca/id/eprint/2944/1/Woods_Alastair_2020_MDES_SFI_MRP.pdf>

The most often used analogy when discussing information overload is to compare our brains to computers. Humans have always attempted to draw parallels between our brains and their era’s prevailing technologies. The Greeks compared the functioning of the brain to a hydraulics system; 18th century philosophers preferred the mechanical clock; early neuroscientists built a framework of cognition based on electric wires or telephone polls, transmitting different signals (Vlasits; 2017). Putting aside the fact that the science behind the theory of computational thinking is far from settled (Epstein; 2016), the brain-as computer metaphor is just that - a metaphor. The irony of using it as a way of understanding our anxieties of information overload is that it is a simplified representation of the complex, uncertain reality of human consciousness; the same kind of ontological exercise we must engage in render our world understandable to computers (Auerbach; 2012). If we accept the metaphor of the brain as a computer, then it can be easy to understand the argument that information overload poses a real and present danger to our attention spans - and, by extension, our individual and collective well-being. In Uncanny Valley, Anna Wiener’s memoir about her time working at start-ups in New York and San Francisco, examples of information overload’s existential threat abound. Recounting how Big Tech’s values of efficiency and speed were bleeding into the analog world, Wiener writes: “Sometimes I would worry about my internet habits and force myself away from the computer, to read a magazine or a book. Contemporary literature offered no respite: I would find prose cluttered with data points, tenuous historical connections, detail so finely tuned it could only have been extracted from a feverish night of search-engine queries. Aphorisms were in; authors were wired.” (Wiener; 2020) In this narrative, nothing escapes technology’s insatiable and accelerating drive for more information; even the noble art of literature is stripped of its meditative ethos and rendered nothing more than a sloppy Google-search made tangible in the material world. But the pressure to condense vast quantities of information into a single, comprehensive source isn’t new. In the 13th century, the Dominican Vincent de Bauvais lamented “the multitude of books, the shortness of time and the slipperiness of memory” when confronted with the supposed overabundance of information available in his medieval world. As a service to humanity, de Bauvais undertook the writing of a “massive book (of some 4.5 million words) in which he gathered the ‘flowers’ or best bits of all the books he was able to read to spare others the costs (in time, effort and access to books) of doing so themselves” (Blair; 2011). The writer Joshua Cohen notes the appearance of “Continued on the next page...” below newspaper articles in the early 1900s as a sign of a newfound fixation on accommodating as much information on the front page as possible. “There was too much to read, in too many forms,” Cohen writes, lamenting that “[a] concerned citizen’s only hope was to read faster. To skim, scan, cluster, chunk” (Cohen; 2018). The concept of information overload is also a fear based on a narrow definition of “information” as the sensory output of our screens. But our brains are always processing information, and our worlds - both natural and built, material and digital - are constantly trying to catch and hold our attention. The colours of flowers, the movement of people and traffic, changes in air pressure and weather, our own internal monologues are all examples of non-digital information that is constantly presented to us, even if we don’t consciously recognize them as such. Our brains must pick and choose which information is relevant to us at any given moment - and the science shows that they are incredibly good at it. University of Virginia psychology professor Timothy Wilson estimates that our brains receive almost 11 million pieces of information per second; and only 40 of those bits of information can be consciously processed (Wilson; 2004). The American technology journalist Clay Shirky locates the problem not in the volume of information we receive but rather an inadequate filtering system to present us with information that is useful, validated and valuable (O’Reilly Partners; 2008). He defines information overload as having “more information in one place than one human being could deal with in one lifetime” (Juskalian; 2008). As Shirky points out, during the time of the printing press, and even through to public radio and television, there was a kind of quality control enacted by the publishers and producers - it wasn’t simply that just anyone could publish a book or broadcast a show (O’Reilly Partners; 2008). Digital technology erases distinctions between author and publisher, which has the benefit of unleashing the creative potential of anyone with access to a computer. But the downside to this is that traditional standards of “quality” no longer apply: anyone can do anything, increasing the risk of biased, misleading or false information becoming indistinguishable from the truth - with the potential for dire social, political and economic consequences (Deb et al; 2017). Take, for example, the anxiety over information “echo chambers” online, in which people of similar political and personal persuasions produce and consume information that only confirms their values and beliefs (Deb et al; 2017). The problem with this perspective is that there is little evidence to back it up: a 2018 report by the Knight Foundation concluded that most people have diverse media diets that expose them to competing viewpoints, with only a very small subset of the population likely to visit the same sources of information consistently (Guess et al; 2018). Indeed, a 2020 study on the media ecosystem of social media platforms found “strong evidence that intermediaries foster more varied online news diets...call[ing] into question fears about the vanishing potential for incidental news exposure in digital media environments” (Scharkow et al; 2020). Ironically, the studies suggest that people are more likely to experience the “echo chamber effect” in their offline social lives, because exposure to differing points of view are much more limited in this context, since friends and family are already likely to share our beliefs and values (Guess et al; 2018). If we are more likely to find ourselves confined to information bubbles at our kitchen table than on our Twitter feeds, then the popular anxieties around digital echo chambers are not only misplaced, but perhaps a reflection of a different kind of fear. As the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips has pointed out, our contemporary era “always claims to be widening our attention (and sympathy) without always being able to know what to do with the attention it has made possible” (Phillips; 2019). The internet was meant to be a medium of connection, understanding and empathy; but the fear is always of the wrong kind of connections, understandings and empathy - either by willful selection, as in the case of alt-right internet trolls ; or by unintentional exclusion, when algorithms give us information that reinforces our viewpoints. The pernicious myth of the digital echo chamber then is a reflection of a deeper cultural anxiety around the different kinds of attention that digital technologies make possible. As Phillips reminds us: “The catastrophe is always of people being too interested in the wrong things, in the wrong ways” - and in our era of unprecedented access to information, the opportunities for such catastrophic interest seem limitless (Phillips; 2019). ITS THE (ATTENTION) ECONOMY, STUPID All of these fears and anxieties about the distracting nature of digital life are predicated on understanding attention as a kind of finite resource which circulates in an economy. Some view the “attention economy” as simply a reflection of late capitalism’s relentless drive to monetize human experience. Writing in 2006, Jonathon Beller decried the “commodification of the sensorium,” arguing that “[l]ike clean air, attention is something that once could be had for free but is now being encroached upon as the next and perhaps final frontier. Attention is now a commodity, and a special kind of commodity at that” (Beller; 2007). There is much evidence that Big Tech leverages design thinking and behavioural science to fine tune their platforms to keep us interested (Schulson; 2015). In 2014, Facebook came under fire after publishing a study conducted with academics at Cornell and Columbia Universities which revealed it had intentionally filtered the newsfeeds of almost 700,000 users to determine if it could change their emotional state based on what they saw (Booth; 2014). Experiments like these reflect the fact that “social media networks” are really just advertising platforms: 98.5% of Facebook’s revenue - about $55 billion - comes from selling ads (Mozilla Foundation; 2019). But for all the “attention economy” narrative tells us about how digital media platforms are sophisticated mechanisms of transaction, it tells us little about what is being exchanged - what exactly are we “paying” when we are “paying attention”? In 1996, long before the rise of social media and the ubiquitous presence of the internet in our daily lives, Thomas Mandel and Gerard Van der Leun’s book Rules of the Net declared that “[a]ttention is the hard currency of cyberspace” (Van der Leun and Mandel; 1996). More than two decades later, we’re no closer to describing what this currency actually is - despite it supposedly serving as the economic fuel of the World Wide Web. Michael H. Goldhaber, writing for Wired in 1997, highlighted the importance and value of attention on the internet when he warned “It really is scarce, and the total amount per capita is strictly limited” (Goldhaber; 1997). But curiously, in the same article, Goldhaber produces a list of the abundant forms this supposedly scant resource can take alongside its myriad functions, acknowledging that attention comes in many formats, all of which are highly context dependent. Such confusion over attention’s definition should cast doubt upon the argument that the mediums of digital technology are what cause our distraction and the problems we believe are its byproducts. How do we define a transaction of attention in the digital age? As previously articulated by David Auerbach, we can only define the transaction with the options afforded to us by the technologies we engage with, technologies we built. This means that the material reality of paying attention in the attention economy is likes, retweets, shares, views, comments and clicks. This is what attention’s myriad forms - love, criticism, care, heeding, recognition, etc - get reduced to (See Figure 7). The digital culture critic Tom Chatfield argues that such frameworks for understanding attention confuse targets and measures, blurring the distinction between courting attention and manufacturing it, asking: “What are we actually talking about when we base both business and mental models on a ‘resource’ that, to all intents and purposes, is fabricated from scratch every time a new way of measuring it comes along?” (Chatfield; 2013). The prominence of ‘click farms’ (Mendoza; 2014) and bulk purchasing of followers on social media (Lieber; 2014) are two examples of the attention economy’s confused logic: if attention is a currency, then what does it mean to buy attention with actual currency? Chatfield proposes that perhaps we are using the wrong analogies to understand the attention economy, arguing that a more useful metaphor is not to posit the singular value of “attention,” but rather to focus on the different kinds of attention certain technologies make possible: “Attention-engineers are effectively distributing printing presses for a private currency — and with everyone else desperate to churn out as much as possible, by any means possible, what’s going on is more a chaotic scramble for advantage than a rational trade in resources.” (Chatfield; 2013) At first glance, the analogies we use to understand distraction in the digital age seem to reduce attention to a scarce and narrowly-defined commodity, while distraction is abundant. But a closer, more critical look seems to reveal the opposite: attention is abundant, diverse, dynamic, situational and kaleidoscopic. If attention can take different forms, through different mediums, under different circumstances, then it is worth considering distraction not as attention’s absence, but as its flowering; something the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips alluded to when he wrote “undevoted attention is presumably attention devoted elsewhere” (Phillips; 2019). DISTRACTED BY DISTRACTION The answers to the question of what digital technology is doing to our attention are complex and nuanced. As the history of communications technology has shown, it is not until long after a medium is introduced that we come to fully appreciate the ways in which it has shaped our experience. The only disadvantage we have relative to the world of writing, printing, radio or television is that digital media and technology are still relatively young mediums of communication, and they offer much more agency to consumers. Zeynep Tufecki has pointed out that Google, Facebook and Twitter are more or less teenagers by technological standards. At the same stage in the evolution of the auto industry, there were no seatbelts, airbags, emissions controls or crumple zones (Tufekci; 2018). This should put our anxieties about digital technology in perspective: with enough time, it is more likely that we will adjust to these technologies in ways that are far less damaging than we are afraid of. But that adjustment requires us to know what we are talking about; we need to be able to identify the real challenges these mediums pose without sinking into utopian denial or dystopian cynicism. This is why it is so important to question both digital technology itself and the critiques of it: that they are designed to be addictive or to sap our finite attention; that digital media and technology pose unprecedented challenges to social cohesion and well-being; that we are lost within what the writer David Foster Wallace would have termed the “Total Noise” of information overload, “the seething static of every particular thing and experience” (Chatfield; 2013). Unpacking these arguments has revealed that they stand on shared cultural assumptions more than hard evidence. These assumptions seem to be where the problem lies. We speak of technology capturing, stimulating, warping, monetizing and commercializing our attention as if we know what attention is. We understand 35 attention as a kind of transaction, and fear that when it comes to digital technology, we’re not getting a fair deal: we’re giving away too much for too little, freely or unconsciously. This transaction leaves us with less attention for other, ostensibly more important things - though what those things are is usually left unsaid. Under these assumptions, the problem becomes not our understanding of what is being exchanged (attention), but the mechanisms through which it is exchanged (technology). But how can we talk about regaining control of our attention if we don’t even know what it is? It would seem, therefore, that a better articulation of our relationship with technology requires first that we pay attention to what we mean when we talk about paying attention.

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#### The computational metaphor is dangerous because it overdetermines causes of violence and erases agency. It was not computers that caused slavery and it was not computers that caused 8 minutes of kneeling on George Floyd’s neck

Fuchs 17 Christian Fuchs is Professor and the Director of the Communication and Media Research Institute, University of Winchester, Social Media a Critical Introduction, pp 89-90

One problem regarding Manuel Castells's (2009) book Communication Power is that he tends to use rather technocratic language for describing networks and communication power- social networks, technological networks and techno-social networks are all described with the same categories and metaphors that originate in computer science and computer technol- ogy: program. meta-programmers. switches. switchers. configuration. inter-operability, pro- tocols, network standards, network components, kernel, program code and so on. I have no doubt that Castells does not intend to conflate the difference between social and technologi- cal networks. He has argued in the past, for example, that social networks are a "networking fonn of social organization" and that information technology is the "material basis" for the "pervasive expansion" of social networks (Castells 2010. 500). But even if the terminology that Manuel Castells now tends to employ is only under- stood in a metaphorical sense, it is a problem that he describes society and social systems in technological and computational terms so that the dijferentia specifica of society in comparison to computers and computer networks - that society is based on humans, reflexive and self-conscious beings that have cultural norms, anticipative thinking, and a certain freedom of action that computers do not have - gets lost. It is no surprise that, based on the frequent employment of such metaphors, Castclls (2009, 45) considers Bruno Latour's actor network theory as brilliant. It is important that one distinguishes the qualities of social networks from the qualities of technological networks and identifies the emergent qualities of techno-social networks such as the lnternet (Fuchs 2008a, 12 I-147). Castells acknowledges that there is a "parallel with software language" (Castells 2009. 48) in his terminology, but he does not give reasons why he uses these parallels or why he thinks such parallels are useful. Obviously society is shaped by computers, but it is not a computer itself, so there is, in my opinion, simply no need for such a technological conflationism. Computer metaphors of society can, just like biological metaphors of society, become dangerous under certain circumstances so, in my opinion, it is best not to start to categorically conflate the qualitative difference between society and technology. Technology is part of society and society creates, produces and reproduces technology. Society is more than just technology and has emergent qualities that stem from the synergetical interactions of human beings. Technology is one of many results of the productive societal interactions of human beings. It therefore has qualities that are, on the one hand, specifically societal but, on the other hand, different from the qualities of other products of society. It is a common aspect of social and technological networks that there are nodes and interactions in all networks. One should not forget the important task of differentiating between the various emergent qualities that technological networks and social networks have - emergent qualities that interact when these two kinds of networks are combined in the form of techno-social networks such as the lntemet so that meta-emergent techno-social qualities appear.

#### The computational metaphor is bad because it overdetermines the hegemonic explanation of technology and capitalism and erases agency

Vostal 14 Filip Vostal University of Bristol, UK Thematizing speed: Between critical theory and cultural analysis, European Journal of Social Theory 2014, Vol 17(1) 95–114 Sage database KU Libraries

One of the problems with those otherwise illuminating and important analyses is that they dwell on a deterministic logic saying that ICTs, globalization, capitalism or neoliberalism, or a combination of thereof, are the hegemonic forces that satisfactorily explain and explicate causes of acceleration. The effects and social impact of ICT-driven acceleration are considerable and unprecedented, according to these authors: an environmental catastrophe is looming; identities are fragmented; adaptation is impossible; democracy must be re-temporalized; a cult of speed has taken over; our thinking is ‘abbreviated’; we all live in a profound ‘age of distraction’. In these analyses, individuals are portrayed as mere subjects to fast temporality, subsumed to acceleration imperatives of the ‘neoliberalization-globalization nexus’ and ‘logics of computing’. The question of agency and the ways in which individuals craft and negotiate their subjective time rules and resources remains unexamined (on a similar point and on the problem of temporal determinism and agency see the seminal work of Flaherty, 2011, chapters 1 and 8). Not to mention the distinct possibility that there are individuals who might embrace the liberating powers of speed-loaded experience and dynamism beyond the strict logic of capitalism and the reification of time. Speed in modernity denotes not only conquering time – complying with the regime of clocktime, meeting deadlines, going faster – but also sensual experiences often associated with the movement that enables traversing space more quickly (Duffy, 2009: 18, see also Rosa, 2010b). This inherently modernist feature also holds in a figurative sense: individuals may potentially embrace nimble decision-making and energetic conduct while pursing their aspirations and projects.

### 1NR---Impact

#### Warming magnifies settler impositions

Whyte 16. Kyle Powys Whyte, Michigan State University Timnick Chair in the Humanities, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Community Sustainability In Press. “Is it Colonial Déjà Vu? Indigenous Peoples and Climate Injustice” November 2016. . Humanities for the Environment: Integrating Knowledges, Forging New Constellations of Practice. Edited by Joni Adamson, Michael Davis, and Hsinya Huang. Earthscan Publications. Pages 88-104. ckm-eg.

Climate change fits succinctly within this pattern. For this reason, many contemporary Indigenous peoples are concerned about their vulnerability, or susceptibility to be harmed, by impacts associated with the observed rise of global average temperature, or climate change. That is, they are concerned about climate risks as they are increasingly confronted by change stemming from the carbon intensive economic activities of settler and other colonial societies. Climate change impacts can be seen through the lens of forms of containment (among other forms of domination), this time arising from settler contributions to increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Warming waters and receding glaciers affect the fish habitats in Indigenous territories all over the world, such as on the Pacific coast of North America where many Tribal nations harvest salmon for economic and cultural purposes (Bennett et al.). Sea level rise is pushing people living in the Village of Kivalina in Alaska, the Isle de St. Charles in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Carteret Atoll in Papua New Guinea to relocate (Maldonado et al.). In these cases we see 8 both shrinking habitats and relocation occurring again. The Loita Maasai peoples in Africa face droughts that affect the rain conditions required for performing many of their ceremonies (Saitabu). Indigenous women, girls and two spirit persons in the Arctic and Great Plains regions are subject to greater sexual violence, abuse and trafficking as work camps for oil and gas extraction, such as ‘fracking,’ bring in male contractors to profit from the resources found within Indigenous territories (Sweet). Climate change impacts and drivers represent another form of inflicted anthropogenic environmental change. Scientific reports confirm many of the threats just described. In 2014, the U.S. National Climate Assessment states that Indigenous peoples face the ‘loss of traditional knowledge in the face of rapidly changing ecological conditions, increased food insecurity… changing water availability, Arctic sea ice loss, permafrost thaw, and relocation from historic homeland’ (Bennett et al. 2). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report claims Indigenous peoples face ‘challenges to post-colonial power relations, cultural practices, their knowledge systems, and adaptive strategies’ (Adger et al.). Indigenous peoples’ own descriptions of climate risk indicate that settler and other colonial societies are imposing rapid environmental change that generates otherwise preventable harms. The Mandaluyong Declaration quotes Miskito women in the Americas who say, in response to changing environmental conditions, that “We now live in a hurry and daughters do not cook as grandmothers… We do not catch fish as before, do not cook as before; we cannot store food and seeds as before; the land no longer produces the same; small rivers are drying up… I think that along with the death of our rivers, our culture dies also.” (300-01). For many Indigenous peoples, these rapid changes are experienced as a continuation of settler colonialism and other forms of colonialism that they have endured for many years. For we have experienced these types of environmentally-related impacts before— from dietary change to relocation to sexual violence—though caused by different factors, such as multiple settler institutions of containment. Though institutions of containment represent just one limited example of a much more complex history with settler colonialism. Anthropogenic climate change is of a piece with forms of nonconsensual and harmful environmental change inflicted on our societies in the past. Some Indigenous peoples look at futures of 9 rampant climate injustice as looking to the cyclical history of settler and other colonial inflictions of anthropogenic environmental change on Indigenous peoples in order to instantiate erasure. Yet what is more insidious about climate injustice against Indigenous peoples is that the settler institutions such as those of containment, that inflicted environmental change in the past, are the same institutions that fostered carbon-intensive economic activities on Indigenous territories. That is, containment strategies, such as removal of Indigenous peoples to reservations or the forced adoption of corporate government structures, all facilitated extractive industries, deforestation and large-scale agriculture. What is more, and as I will discuss in more detail in later sections, these are the same institutions that today make it hard for many Indigenous peoples to effectively cope with climate change impacts. In this way, climate injustice against Indigenous peoples refers to the vulnerability caused by ongoing, cyclical colonialism both because institutions facilitate carbon-intensive economic activities that produce adverse impacts while at the same time interfering with Indigenous people’s capacity to adapt to the adverse impacts